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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
How  Large  Are  Human-Capital 
Externalities?  Evidence  from 
Compulsory  Schooling  Laws 
1. Introduction 
The effect of human capital on aggregate income is of central importance 
to both policymakers  and economists.  A tradition going  back to Schultz 
(1967) and  Nelson  and  Phelps  (1966) views  the  human  capital  of  the 
workforce  as a crucial factor facilitating  the  adoption  of new  and more 
productive  technologies  (see  Foster  and  Rosenzweig,  1996,  for  evi- 
dence).  Similarly, many  recent  endogenous  growth  models  emphasize 
the  link between  human  capital  and  growth.  For example,  in  Lucas's 
(1988) model,  worker productivity  depends  on the aggregate  skill level, 
whereas  Romer (1990) suggests  that societies  with  more skilled workers 
generate  more ideas  and grow  faster. More generally,  many  economists 
believe  that  cross-country  income  disparities  are due  in  large  part  to 
differences  in  human  capital  (e.g.,  Mankiw,  Romer,  and  Weil,  1992). 
Figure 1 plots  the logarithm  of output  per worker relative  to the United 
States for 103 countries  against  average  years of schooling  in 1985. Con- 
sistent  with  this  view,  the  figure  shows  a strong  correlation  between 
output  per  worker  and  schooling.  In fact,  the bivariate  regression  line 
plotted  in Figure 1 has an R2  of 65%.1 
We thank Alexis  Leon,  Chris Mazingo,  and Xuanhui  Ng  for excellent  research assistance, 
and  our discussants  Mark Bils and Cecelia Rouse  for their comments.  Thanks  also go  to 
Paul Beaudry, Bill Evans, Bob Hall, Larry Katz, Enrico Moretti, Jim Poterba, Robert Shimer, 
and seminar participants  at the Canadian Institute for Advanced  Research, the 2000 NBER 
Macroeconomics  Annual  Conference,  the  1999 NBER Summer  Institute,  University  Col- 
lege London,  Cornell University, the University  of Maryland, and the University  of Toronto 
for helpful  discussions  and  comments.  Special  thanks  to Stefanie  Schmidt  for advice  on 
compulsory-schooling  data. 
1. Data on  output  per worker  are from Summers  and Heston  (1991), with  the correction 
due to Hall and Jones (1999). Education data are from Barro and Lee (1993). See Krueger 10 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
Figure 1 LOG  OUTPUT  PER  WORKER  AND YEARS  OF SCHOOLING 
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The line shows the fitted  OLS  relationship.  The slope coefficient  is 0.29, and the standard  error  is 0.02. 
A  simple  calculation  suggests  that  for, education  to  raise  income  as 
steeply  as suggested  by Figure 1, there must be large human-capital exter- 
nalities.  To see  this,  note  that the private return to schooling, i.e.,  the  in- 
crease in individual  earnings resulting  from an additional  year of school- 
ing, is about 6-10% (e.g.,  Card, 1999). If the social return to schooling, i.e., 
the increase in total earnings resulting from a one-year increase in average 
schooling,  is of roughly  the same magnitude,  then differences  in school- 
ing  can  explain  little  of  the  cross-country  variation  in  income.  More 
specifically, the difference in average schooling  between  the top and bot- 
tom deciles of the world education  distribution in 1985 is less than 8 years. 
With  social  returns  to  schooling  around  10%, we  would  expect  the 
top-decile  countries  to produce  about twice  as much  per worker  as the 
bottom-decile  countries.  In fact, the  output-per-worker  gap is approxi- 
mately  15.  Put  differently,  a causal  interpretation  of  Figure  1 requires 
and  Lindahl  (1999)  for  a detailed  analysis  of  the  cross-country  relationship  between 
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human-capital  externalities on  the  order of 25-30%,  approximately  three 
times as large as the private returns to schooling.2 
Human-capital  externalities  are important for education  policy  as well 
as for cross-country  income  differences.  Current education  policies  are 
often justified  on the basis of at least modest  externalities.  Nevertheless, 
there  is  little  empirical  work  estimating  human-capital  externalities. 
Moreover,  even  as  a theoretical  matter,  it is  not  clear  whether  social 
returns should  exceed  private returns. Despite  the emphasis  on human- 
capital externalities  in recent growth  models,  education  may also play a 
signaling  role (e.g.,  Spence,  1973; Lang and Kropp,  1986). If schooling 
has  signaling  value,  social returns to education  can be less  than private 
returns.  In the extreme  case where  schooling  does  not increase  human 
capital  but  is  only  a signal,  aggregate  income  is  unchanged  when  all 
workers  increase their schooling  by one year, so social returns are zero. 
Social returns may also be less  than private returns if some  other factor 
of production  is inelastically  supplied. 
Rauch  (1993)  is  the  first  attempt  to  estimate  human-capital  exter- 
nalities.  His  results  suggest  there  are externalities  on  the  order  of  3- 
5%, though  he also reports some  considerably  larger estimates.  Rauch's 
estimates  are driven  by  differences  in  average  schooling  across  cities. 
But higher  incomes  might  cause  more  schooling  instead  of vice  versa. 
Cities with  greater average  schooling  may also have  higher wages  for a 
variety  of other reasons.  This highlights  the fact that a major challenge 
in  estimating  the  effects  of  education  on  income  is  identification.  To 
solve  this problem,  we  use  instrumental  variables  to estimate  the effect 
of the  average  schooling  level  in an individual's  state.  An ideal  instru- 
ment  for average  schooling  would  affect the  schooling  of the  majority 
of workers  in a given  area. Differences  in compulsory  attendance  laws 
and child labor laws  in U.S.  states between  1920 and 1960 provide  such 
variation. 
State  compulsory  attendance  laws  and  child  labor  laws,  which  we 
refer to together  as compulsory  schooling laws (CSLs), generate  an attrac- 
tive natural experiment  for the estimation  of human-capital  externalities 
(or  external returns) for  a  number  of  reasons.  First,  while  these  laws 
were  determined  by social forces operating  in states  at the time of pas- 
sage,  the CSLs that affected  an individual  in childhood  are not affected 
by  future  wages.  Childhood  CSLs  are  therefore  exogenous  to  adult 
2. The slope of the line in Figure 1, 0.29, corresponds  to social returns  of 34%  (e0?29  -  1 - 
0.34). The difference  between top- and bottom-decile  countries  implies social returns  on 
the order of 40%.  To  rationalize  Figure  1, we therefore  need human-capital  externalities 
of 25-30%  on top of the 6-10% private  returns. 12 - ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
wages.  Second,  although  in principle CSLs may be correlated with omit- 
ted factors that also  affect schooling  and future wages,  we  provide  evi- 
dence  suggesting  this  is  not  a problem.  Omitted  variables  related  to 
family  background  or tastes  would  likely  induce  correlation  between 
CSLs and college  attendance  as well as secondary  and middle  schooling. 
The  results  below  show  that  CSLs  affected  schooling  exclusively  in 
middle-school  and  high-school  grades,  suggesting  that omitted  factors 
do not bias estimates  using  CSLs as instruments.  A third consideration  is 
that changing  CSLs were  part of the  1910-1940  high-school  movement 
that Goldin  (1998) has  argued  was  responsible  for much  of the human- 
capital accumulation  in the United  States in the twentieth  century. 
The baseline  results in the paper use samples  of white  men aged 40-49 
from the  1960-1980  Censuses,  though  some  results  use  1950 and  1990 
data and samples  of men  aged  30-39.  We focus  on the  1960-1980  Cen- 
suses  because  the Census  schooling  variable changed  in 1990. Also,  we 
show  below  that it is important to control for private returns correctly by 
instrumenting  for  individual  schooling  when  estimating  external  re- 
turns.  The 1960-1980  Censuses  include  information  on quarter of birth, 
which  can  be  used  as  an  instrument  for  individual  schooling  as  in 
Angrist  and Krueger (1991). We start with  men in their 40s because  they 
are on  a relatively  flat part of  the  age-earnings  profile.  This  makes  it 
easier to control for the effect of individual  education  on earnings,  and 
facilitates  the  use  of quarter-of-birth instruments  for individual  school- 
ing.  Finally, blacks are excluded  because  blacks in these  cohorts  experi- 
enced  marked changes  in school  quality (see,  e.g.,  Welch,  1973; Margo, 
1990; or Card and Krueger, 1992a). 
Ordinary least-squares  (OLS) estimates  using  data from the 1960-1980 
Censuses  show  a large positive  relationship  between  average  schooling 
and individual  wages.  A one-year increase in average schooling  is associ- 
ated  with  about  a 7% increase  in  average  wages,  over  and  above  the 
roughly equal private returns. In contrast with the OLS estimates,  instru- 
mental variables (IV) estimates  of external returns for men aged 40-49  in 
1960-1980  are typically  around  1-2%,  and  significantly  lower  than  the 
corresponding  OLS estimates.  Adding  data from the 1950 Census  and/or 
data for men  aged  30-39  yields  slightly  smaller  and  more  precise  esti- 
mates.3 We therefore  conclude  there is little evidence  for large external 
returns,  though  the results  are consistent  with  modest  external returns 
of 1-3%.  The confidence  intervals  typically exclude human  capital exter- 
nalities  greater  than  5-6%  and  therefore  rule  out  magnitudes  in  the 
3. Adding  data  from  the  1990 Census  results  in  somewhat  larger estimates  of  external 
returns, but this finding  seems  to be generated  by problems  with  the schooling  variable 
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range of the OLS estimates.  They also rule out magnitudes  necessary  to 
rationalize  the  steep  relationship  between  schooling  and  output  per 
worker  observed  in  Figure  1.  This  implies  that  differences  in  average 
education  are  unlikely  to  be  a  major source  of  cross-country  income 
differences. 
A  shortcoming  of  the  approach  used  here  is  that  it identifies  local 
human-capital  externalities  only.  We miss  externalities  that arise if, for 
example,  more-skilled  workers  generate  ideas used  in other parts of the 
country. It should  be noted,  however,  that most  theories  of externalties 
suggest  an  important  local  component  (see,  e.g.,  Glaeser  et  al.,  1992, 
and  Jaffe,  Trajtenberg,  and  Henderson,  1993).  Another  limitation  of 
estimation  based  on  CSLs is  that  CSL variation  mainly  affects  secon- 
dary education.  A recent paper by Moretti (1999) explores  the relation- 
ship  between  increasing  numbers  of  college  graduates  and  income  in 
U.S.  cities.  Moretti finds  sizable  human-capital  externalities.  These  re- 
sults  might  be  driven  by  greater  externalities  from  college  education, 
though  they  might  also reflect differences  in empirical  strategy.  In any 
case,  externalities  from high  school  are probably at least as important as 
externalities  from college  education;  the bulk of twentieth-century  U.S. 
human-capital  accumulation  is accounted  for by  changes  in secondary 
schooling,  as  are most  of  the  differences  in  schooling  between  high- 
and low-education  countries. 
The next section lays out two simple  economic  models  that show  how 
human-capital  externalities  can arise. These  models  are used  to develop 
an  estimation  framework  and  to  highlight  the  econometric  issues  in- 
volved  in  identifying  the  external  returns  to  education.  Section  3 dis- 
cusses  the data and reports OLS estimates  from regressions  on individ- 
ual  and  average  schooling.  Section  4  describes  the  CSL instruments, 
Section  5 reports the IV estimates,  and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Theories  of  Human-Capital  Externalities 
Many different interactions can lead to human-capital  externalities. Here, 
we  discuss  two possibilities,  and derive  a simple  theoretical relationship 
to be estimated. 
2.1. THEORIES  OF NONPECUNIARY  EXTERNALITIES 
In  The Economy of Cities, Jane Jacobs (1970)  argued  that  cities  are  an 
engine  of economic  growth because  they facilitate the exchange  of ideas, 
especially  between  entrepreneurs  and managers  (see also Bairoch, 1988). 
This notion  also provides  part of the motivation  for Lucas's (1988) argu- 
ment  that  human  capital  has  important  external  returns.  We refer to 14 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
exterality  theories  in  this  mold  as  nonpecuniary because  the  external 
effects  work  not  through  prices,  but  rather  through  the  exchange  of 
ideas,  imitation,  or learning by doing. 
To discuss  these  ideas  more  formally,  suppose  that  the  output  (or 
marginal product)  of a worker, i, is 
Yi = Ah i, 
where  hi is the human  capital (schooling)  of the worker,  and A is aggre- 
gate productivity.  So individual  earnings  are Wi = Ah  ". 
The notion that the exchange  of ideas among workers raises productiv- 
ity can be captured by allowing  A to depend  on aggregate  human  capi- 
tal. In particular, suppose  that 
A =  BH  -  B(E[hp])8/1,  (1) 
where  H is a measure  of aggregate  human  capital,  E is the expectation 
operator,  B is a constant,  and  p determines  how  the  human  capital  of 
different workers  are aggregated  into this measure.  In Lucas's model,  p 
=  1, so what  matters is average  human  capital in a society  or city. An- 
other  possibility,  discussed  by  Murphy,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1991), is 
that  the  skills  of  the  most  talented  individuals  create  externalities,  in 
which  case we have p --  oo.  Finally, Benabou (1996) proposes  an equation 
similar to (1) with  p <  0, so that inequality  in the distribution  of human 
capital  depresses  aggregate  productivity.  Acemoglu  (1997b)  derives  a 
similar relationship  with  p <  0 from imperfect job matching. 
For any value  of p, the parameter  8 measures  the importance  and sign 
of external effects in the production  process.  Individual  earnings  can be 
written  as Wi = Ahr = BH8h  ^  Therefore,  taking logs,  we have 
In Wi =  In B +  S In H +  v In hi.  (2) 
If external effects are stronger within  a geographical  area, as seems  likely 
in a world  where  human  interaction  and  the exchange  of ideas  are the 
main  forces  behind  the  externalities,  then  equation  (2) should  be  esti- 
mated  using  measures  of H at the local level. 
2.2. THEORIES  OF PECUNIARY  EXTERNALITIES 
Marshall  (1961) argued  that increasing  the  geographic  concentration  of 
specialized  inputs  increases  productivity,  since  the  matching  between 
factor inputs  and industries  is improved.  A similar story is developed  in How  Large  Are  Human-Capital  Externalities?  *  15 
Acemoglu (1997a),  where firms find it profitable to invest in new tech- 
nologies only when there is a sufficient supply of trained workers to 
replace employees who quit. We refer  to this sort of effect as a pecuniary 
externality,  since greater  human capital  encourages more investment by 
firms and raises other workers'  wages via this channel. Here, we outline 
a  related theory of  pecuniary human-capital exteralities  based  on 
Acemoglu (1996). 
Consider  an economy lasting two periods, with production  only in the 
second period, and a continuum of workers normalized to 1. For now, 
take human capital,  hi,  as given. There  is also a continuum  of risk-neutral 
firms. In period 1, firms make an irreversible  investment decision, k, at 
cost Rk. Workers and firms come together in the second period. The 
labor market  is not competitive;  instead, firms and workers are matched 
randomly,  and each firm meets a worker.  The only decision workers  and 
firms make after matching is whether to produce together or not to 
produce at all (since there are no further  periods). If firmf and worker i 
produce together, their output is 
kfhi,  (3) 
where a <  1, v '  1 -  a. Since it is costly for the worker-firm pair to 
separate and find new partners in this economy, employment relation- 
ships generate quasi-rents. Wages will therefore be determined by rent 
sharing. Here, we simply assume that the worker receives a share 3  of 
the output, while the firm receives the remaining share, 1 -  13. 
An equilibrium  in this economy is a set of physical capital  investments 
for firms. Firmf maximizes the expected profit function 
(1 -  13)kfE[hrJ  -  Rkf  (4) 
with respect to kf. Since firms do not know which worker they will be 
matched with, their expected profit is an average of profits from differ- 
ent skill levels. The function (4) is strictly  concave, so all firms  choose the 
same level of capital  investment, kf  =  k, given by 
k=  (1  - 
3)aH  )  k  l 
= 
)  '  (5) 
where 16 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
H  E[h'] 
is now  the measure  of aggregate  human  capital. Substituting  (5) into (3), 
and  using  the  fact that  wages  are equal  to  a fraction  8 of  output,  the 
wage  income  of  individual  i  is  given  by  W  =  P((1-P3)aH/R)-a 
) hF. 
Taking logs,  this is 
In Wi = c +  ln H +  v  ln  hi,  (6)  1-a 
where  c is a constant  and a/(l  -  a) and  v are positive  coefficients.4 
Human-capital  externalities arise here because firms choose their physi- 
cal capital in anticipation of the average human capital of the workers they 
will employ  in the future.  Since physical  and human  capital are comple- 
ments  in this setup,  a more educated  labor force leads  to greater invest- 
ment in physical  capital and to higher wages.  In the absence  of the need 
for search  and  matching,  firms  would  immediately  hire  workers  with 
skills  appropriate  to their investments,  and  there would  be no human- 
capital externalities.5 
Nonpecuniary  and  pecuniary  theories  of human-capital  externalities 
lead  to similar empirical  relationships,  since  equation  (6) is identical  to 
equation  (2), with  c = In B and 6 =  a/(l  -  a). A similar relationship  also 
arises  if  more-educated  workers  produce  higher-quality  intermediate 
goods,  and monopolistically  competitive  upstream and downstream  pro- 
ducers  locate  in  the  same  area.  Thus,  an  empirical  strategy  based  on 
relationships  of this sort cannot  distinguish  between  the types  of exter- 
nalities we have  discussed.  Nevertheless,  lack of evidence  of a role for H 
in  individual  wage  determination  weighs  against  all  of  these  mecha- 
nisms,  at the least at the local level. 
2.3 ESTIMATING  THE  EXTERNAL  RETURNS  TO EDUCATION 
The models  discussed  above are closed by a mechanism  explaining  indi- 
vidual  education  decisions.  Suppose  that an individual's  human  capital 
is given by 
4. As in Acemoglu  (1996), human-capital  externalities  are additive  in logs,  so the marginal 
product  of  a  more  skilled  worker  increases  when  the  average  workforce  skill  level 
increases.  Acemoglu  (1998, 1999) discusses  models  in which log wage  differences  between 
skilled  and unskilled  workers  increase with  average  skill levels. 
5. In  a  frictionless  world,  firms  maximize  profits  conditional  on  realized  worker-firm 
matches instead  of conditional  on the expected  match,  and pay the full marginal product 
of the worker.  In this case,  firm j matched  to worker  i chooses  capital kj =  (ah '/r)1/(A-" 
and worker i's wages  is In Wi =  c' +  [va/(1-a)]  In hi. How  Large  Are  Human-Capital  Externalities?  ?  17 
hi =  exp  (q7isi), 
where  si is worker  i's schooling.  Workers have  unobserved  ability  i = 
Oigq(si),  which  depends  on an individual  characteristic, Oi,  and also poten- 
tially on  schooling.  This  dependence  captures  potential  decreasing  re- 
turns to individual  schooling,  as in Lang (1993). 
Suppose  also  that  a worker's  consumption,  Ci, is  equal  to his  labor 
income,  and that schooling  is chosen  by workers so as to maximize 
1 
ln  Ci -  -  qis2.  (7) 
The  parameter  1fi is  the  cost  of  education  for individual  i and  can be 
interpreted  as a personal  discount  rate,  along  the  lines  of Card (1995). 
Individual  schooling  decisions  will then be determined  by maximizing 
(7), taking (6) as given.  In both models,  this yields  equilibrium schooling 
levels  satisfying 
v0i[l(s,) + Sin'(si)] =  4,iSi,  (8a) 
or 
n''(s,) (E-1  +  1) =  -,  (8b) 
where  e%  is the elasticity of the function  -7.  The population  average return 
to  optimally  chosen  schooling  levels  is  E[v0i{i7(si) +  si r'(si)}]. But the 
average  return  for  particular  subpopulations  interacts  with  discount 
rates in a manner noted  by Lang (1993) and Card (1995). For example,  if 
1q'(si)  <  O, those  with  high  qi get less  schooling,  and a marginal year of 
schooling  is  worth  more  to  such  people  than  the  population  average 
return. 
Equations  (2) and  (6) provide  the  theoretical  basis  for our empirical 
work. Since H is unobserved,  however,  we approximate In H by the state 
average schooling  S.6 Estimation can therefore be based on the following 
equation  for individual  i residing  in state j: 
6. In the pecuniary  externality model,  and in the nonpecuniary  externalities  model  with  p  =  1, this approximation  is natural. Specifically, we have  In H =  In E[exp(v77isi)]  co + cl 
E[7qisi]  c2 +  c3 E[s]. The first step approximates  the mean of the log with  the log of the 
mean.  The second  step  takes E[77i]  and the covariance between  Xi  and si to be constant, 
unaffected  by  changes  in  average  education.  When  p i  1 in  the  nonpecuniary  exter- 
nalities  model,  the variance  of education  will  also matter. With p <  1, greater variance 
reduces  H, and with  p >  1, greater variance increases H. 18 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
In  W1jt  yo -+ ySl  +  Y2qis +  ujt  (9) 
where  Sit =  Ejt(si)  is  the  average  schooling  in  state j  at time  t,  and  ujt 
captures  other factors that affect wages  in that state at time t. An impor- 
tant  implication  of  equation  (9) is  that  if Sit is  correlated  with  average 
ability  among  workers  in  area j,  then  OLS will  not  estimate  y1. One 
reason  for  such  correlation  is  the  endogenous  nature  of  educational 
choices.  Another  is selective  migration. 
2.4 EFFECTS  OF MIGRATION 
Suppose  that individuals  choose  to live in one of two states,  indexed  by 
j =  1 and 2, paying  rent (user cost of housing)  rj  in state j. Suppose  also 
that i receives  additional  utility, ~i, from living  in state 1 instead  of state 
2,  where  fi is  an  independent  draw  from  the  continuous  distribution 
function  G(D).  This taste shock introduces  some  degree  of heterogeneity 
in worker preferences  regarding  residential  location. 
We normalize  the  total housing  stock  of each  state to 1, so  that total 
population  is fixed at 1 in each state. Individuals  have to live and work in 
the same  state.  Rents will  adjust  to clear the housing  market.  The con- 
sumption  of individual  i when  he lives in state j is the difference between 
his  labor income  and  his  rent,  that  is,  Cij =  Wi -  r,  where  Wii is  his 
earnings  when  he lives  and works  in state j. 
To facilitate the discussion,  assume  that a random factor, vj, also affects 
wages  in each state,  so the earnings  of individual  i in state j are given by 
Wij =  BHifhiV  +  vj 
(in the model  of pecuniary  externalities,  8 =  a/(1 -  a) and B = /3[(l -  3) 
a/R]a/(-.  An individual  with human  capital h will be indifferent between 
living  in state 1 and state 2 if he has  Si =  ((h,  Av, Ar), where 
BHLhp +  ' 
(h,  Av, Ar) +  Av -  Ar =  BH28h,  (10) 
with  Ar =  r, -  r2  and Av = v,  -  v2. This implies  that among  people  with 
human  capital h, those  with  ; greater than  t (h, Av, Ar) would  prefer to 
live in state 1 when  the rent differential  is Ar. Denoting  the distribution 
of human  capital by F (-), and exploiting  the fact that  i's are independent 
across individuals,  housing  markets clear when 
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i.e.,  when  half of the population  prefers state  1. Intuitively,  G (~(h,  Av, 
Ar)) is the fraction with human  capital h who  prefer to live in state 2, and 
the integral sums  over all levels  of education.  Equation  (11) determines 
the equilibrium rent differential between  the two states. 
One  implication  of  this  simple  framework  is  that  an  increase  in  H1 
encourages  some  (though not all) skilled workers to live in state 1. This is 
because increasing H1  raises the wages of skilled workers by more than the 
wages of unskilled workers [recall that equations (2) and (6) are additive in 
logs]. Positive state-specific shocks to wages  (i.e.,  Av > 0) therefore attract 
more high-education  workers  to a state and raise average human  capital 
via migration. This differential impact by schooling  group generates posi- 
tive correlation between  average education  and wages  across states,  po- 
tentially biasing  OLS estimates  of external returns. 
It is also interesting  to note that because  rents tend to be higher in the 
state  with  greater average  education,  observed  wage  differences  exag- 
gerate differences  in living standards.  Nevertheless,  for our purposes,  it 
is differences  in wages  without  cost-of-living  adjustments  that are rele- 
vant.  Firms  pay  (unadjusted)  wages  and,  in  equilibrium,  receive  the 
same  return  to  physical  capital  in  both  states.7  Thus,  human-capital 
externalities  are required if firms in the state with greater average educa- 
tion  and higher  wages  are to be able to produce  more  and break even. 
3.  Econometric  Framework 
This section  discusses  instrumental-variables  (IV) strategies  to estimate 
equation  (9), the  causal  relationship  of interest.8 In practice,  of course, 
there are many  factors beside  schooling  that determine  wages.  An error 
term  is  therefore  added  to  the  estimating  equation.  Also,  we  adopt 
notation  that reflects  the  fact that different  individuals  are observed  in 
different years in our data. The resulting  equation  is 
Yijt 
=  X[d  +  5j +  t +  ylSjt  +  Y2iSi  +  Ujt +  Ei,  (12) 
where  Yijt  is the log weekly  wage,  ujt  is a state-year  error component,  and 
Ei  is an individual  error term.  The vector  Xi includes  state-of-birth  and 
year-of-birth dummies,  and  6i and  6t are state-of-residence  and Census- 
7. Firms producing  nontraded  goods  may care only about local prices. But firms producing 
traded goods  face the same prices and have to receive the same rate of return to physical 
capital.  These  firms  must  therefore  have  a more  productive  work  force in high-wage 
states.  Hence,  as long  as there  are some  firms producing  traded goods  in every  state, 
average productivity  has to be higher in states where  wages  are higher. 
8. Brock and  Durlauf  (1999) survey  non-IV  approaches  to estimating  models  with  social 
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year effects.  The random coefficient  on individual  schooling  is y2i  =  y2i, 
while  the coefficient  on average  schooling,  y', is taken to be fixed. 
The most  important  identification  problem  raised by  equation  (12) is 
omitted-variables  bias  from correlation between  average  schooling  and 
other state-year  effects embodied  in the error component  ujt.  The theoreti- 
cal discussion  suggests  at least  two  reasons  for omitted-variables  bias. 
First, economic  growth  may increase wages  in a state, while  also raising 
the  demand  for (or supply)  of schooling.  For example,  state university 
systems  often  expand  during  cyclical upturns,  and higher wealth  levels 
typically  increase  investments  in schooling.  Alternatively,  labor produc- 
tivity  and  tastes  for schooling  in a state may  change  at the  same  time. 
These scenarios correspond  to correlation between  uj and the average cost 
of, or returns to, schooling  in the theoretical model.  To solve this problem, 
we construct instruments  for Si,  using CSLs effective in individuals'  states 
of birth at the time  they were  14. These  instruments  are called state-of- 
birth CSLs (SOB CSLs).  Since  roughly  two-thirds  of the  people  in our 
sample  live  in  their  states  of birth,  the  SOB CSLs are correlated  with 
average  schooling  in states of residence.  SOB CSLs generate  variation in 
average schooling  levels but are unlikely  to be correlated with contempo- 
raneous  state-specific  shocks,  since  they  are derived  from laws  passed 
roughly  30 years before education  and wages  were  recorded.9 
In addition to generating  exogenous  variation in average education,  the 
SOB-CSL instruments  provide  an attractive starting point  because  they 
are attached  to individuals  as opposed  to states.  We can therefore  com- 
pare IV estimates  of the individual  returns to schooling  using  SOB CSLs 
with other IV estimates  using individual  characteristics (such as quarter of 
birth). Human-capital  externalities  should  cause IV estimates  of individ- 
ual returns using  SOB CSLs to diverge  from these  other estimates.10 
A  drawback  of  the  SOB-CSL strategy  is that  it does  not  necessarily 
eliminate  bias  from  state-specific  wage  shocks  if  there  is  substantial 
interstate migration in response.  To see this, suppose  that wages  increase 
in,  say, New  York, and workers  from out  of state are attracted to New 
York. The model  outlined  above  suggests  more-educated  workers  may 
respond  more to the pull of higher wages.  Since more-educated  workers 
are,  on  average,  from  states  with  more  restrictive  SOB CSLs,  selective 
9. The endogenous  variable is state average  schooling  for all residents,  while  the estima- 
tion sample  is limited  to certain age groups.  The CSLs these  men were  exposed  to are 
nevertheless  highly  correlated  with  overall  average  schooling  in  a state because  this 
sample  contributes to the overall average,  and because  the CSLs of neighboring  cohorts 
are correlated with  the CSLs of the estimation  cohort. 
10. A second  reason  we  focus  initially  on  the  SOB-CSL instruments  is that these  instru- 
ments  can be used  without  controlling  for state of residence,  a potentially  endogenous 
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migration by the more educated  can cause these instruments  to be corre- 
lated with  state-specific  shocks. 
To solve  this  problem,  we  create  an  alternative  set  of  instruments 
based  on state of residence  (SOR CSLs). These  instruments  assign  CSLs 
to each individual  according to the laws in effect in their current state of 
residence  30 years before the year they are observed  (i.e.,  approximately 
the time  they  were  14). SOR CSLs are uncorrelated  with  contemporary 
state-specific  shocks,  since  they  are  (by construction)  invariant  to  the 
population  mix  in  a particular  state.  In practice,  SOB CSLs and  SOR 
CSLs lead to similar estimates  of human-capital  externalities,  suggesting 
that differences  in migration  patterns by state of birth are not important. 
While omitted  state-year  effects  are the primary motivation  for these 
two IV strategies,  the fact that one regressor, S#, is the average of another 
regressor, si, also complicates  the interpretation of OLS estimates.  To see 
this,  consider  an "atheoretical" regression  of Yi on both si and Sj, which 
for purposes  of illustration  is assumed  to have  constant  coefficients  and 
a cross-section  dimension  only: 
Yi =  A* +  %osi  +  rjSj +  (i,  where  E[,iSi] =  E[iS]  0.  (13) 
Now,  let po denote  the coefficient  from a bivariate regression  of Yi on si 
only, and let p, denote  the coefficient  from a bivariate regression  of Yi,  on 
Sj only. Note  that p, is the two-stage  least squares  (2SLS) estimate  of the 
coefficient  on si in a bivariate regression  of Yi,  on si using a full set of state 
dummies  as instruments.  Appendix  A.1 shows  that 
o =  Pi  +  (Po -  P),  (14) 
IT1  =  ((Pj-  Po), 
where  (  =  1/(1  -  R2) >  1,  and  R2 is  from  a regression  of  si on  state 
dummies.  Thus,  if for any reason OLS estimates  of the bivariate  regres- 
sion  differ from 2SLS estimates  using  state-dummy  instruments,  the co- 
efficient  on  average  schooling  in  (13) will  be  nonzero.  For example,  if 
grouping  (averaging  across  all individuals  within  a state)  corrects  for 
attenuation  bias due to measurement  error in si, we have p, >  po  and the 
appearance  of  positive  external  returns  even  when  y,  =  0 in  (12).  In 
contrast,  if grouping  eliminates  correlation between  si and  unobserved 
earnings  potential,  we  have  p,  <  po and  the  appearance  of  negative 
external returns.ll 
11. The coefficient  on  average  schooling  in an equation  with  individual  schooling  can be 
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The  interpretation  of  OLS  estimates  is  complicated  even  further 
when  returns  to  education  vary  across  individuals,  as in our random- 
coefficients  specification,  (12). Nevertheless,  an  IV strategy  that treats 
both si and Sj as endogenous  can generate  consistent  estimates  of exter- 
nal returns.  The key to the success  of this approach  is finding  the right 
instrument  for  individual  schooling.  Appendix  A.2  shows  that  if  the 
instrument  for individual  schooling  generates  the  same  average  return 
as would  be generated  using  CSLs as instruments  for individual  school- 
ing,  the resulting  IV estimates  of social returns are consistent.  Quarter- 
of-birth  instruments,  as  in  the  work  of  Angrist  and  Krueger  (1991), 
are  therefore  appropriate  for  individual  schooling  in  our  context  be- 
cause  CSL  and  quarter-of-birth  instruments  both  estimate  individual 
returns for people  whose  schooling  was  affected by compulsory  school- 
ing  laws.  (In  fact,  we  show  below  that,  like  quarter-of-birth  instru- 
ments,  CSLs changed  the  distribution  of schooling  primarily in the  8- 
12 range.) 
4.  Data  and  OLS  Estimates 
4.1  DATA SOURCES 
The analysis begins  with data for U.S.-born white males aged 40-49  from 
the  1960-1980  Censuses.  These  samples  were  chosen  because  they  in- 
clude  data on  quarter of birth and  are limited  to groups  on the  flattest 
part of the  age-earnings  profiles.  This reduces  bias from age or experi- 
ence  effects  when  using  quarter-of-birth dummies  as instruments.  Fol- 
lowing  the  results  using  1960-1980  data,  we  look  at samples  including 
data from the  1950 and  1990 Censuses.  Because  these  censuses  do not 
have  quarter of birth,  estimates  using  the  extended  sample  must  treat 
individual  schooling  as exogenous.  A second  problem with the 1990 data 
is that the schooling  variable is categorical. The last set of results  in the 
paper  are for men  aged  30-39.  Men  younger  than  30 are excluded  be- 
cause many  in this group have yet to finish school.12 
The  schooling  variable  for individuals  in  the  1950-1980  data  is  the 
2SLS estimates of private returns to schooling using state dummies as instruments. 
Borjas  (1992)  discusses a similar  problem  affecting  the estimation  of ethnic-background 
effects. 
12. Data are from  the following IPUMS  files (documented  in Ruggles and Sobek, 1997):  the 
1%  sample for 1960, Form 1 and Form 2 state samples for 1970 (giving a 2%  sample), 
and the 5%  PUMS-A  sample for 1980. The 1950 sample includes all sample-line  indi- 
viduals in the relevant  age-sex-race group, and the 1990  data  are from  the IPUMS  self- 
weighting 1%  file. All regressions are weighted to population proportions.  For addi- 
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highest  grade  completed,  capped  at 17 years  to impose  a uniform  top- 
code  across  censuses.  Average  schooling  in  a  state  and  year  is  mea- 
sured  as the average  of the capped  highest  grade completed  for the full 
sample  of  workers  aged  16-64  (i.e.,  not  limited  to  white  men).  The 
averages  are weighted  by individuals'  weeks  worked  the previous  year. 
For  1990 data,  we  assigned  average  years  of  schooling  to  categorical 
values  using  the  imputation  for  white  men  in  Park (1994).  Average 
schooling  in 1990 is the average  capped  value  of this imputed-years-of- 
schooling  variable.13 
The relevant  labor market for the estimation  of equation  (12) is taken 
to be a state.  Previous  work on external returns in the United  States has 
used  cities,  while  macroeconomic  studies  of education  and growth  use 
countries  (see,  e.g.,  Mankiw,  Romer, and  Weil,  1992; Barro and  Sala-i- 
Martin, 1995; Benhabib and Spiegel,  1994; Bils and Klenow,  1998; Topel, 
1999; or Krueger and  Lindahl,  1999). We work  with  states  because  all 
three PUMS samples  record state of residence,  while the 1960 and part of 
the  1970 PUMS  fail to  identify  cities  or metropolitan  areas.  Since  our 
instruments  are derived  from individuals'  states  of birth and  not  their 
cities of birth, little is lost from this aggregation. 
Table 1 gives  descriptive  statistics  for men  aged  40-49  in all five cen- 
suses.  The average age is constant across censuses,  while average school- 
ing increased by slightly  less than a year between  1950 and 1960, and by 
slightly  more  than  a year between  1960 and  1970,  1970 and  1980, and 
1980 and  1990. The mean  of state average  schooling,  shown  in the row 
below  individual  schooling,  refers to the entire working-age  population. 
The standard  deviation  of average  schooling  summarizes  the  extent  of 
variation  in average  schooling  across states.  The next  two  rows  record 
the  lowest  and  highest  average  schooling.  For example,  in  1980 the 
lowest  average  education  was  11.8 years,  in Kentucky, while  Washing- 
ton, DC had the highest  average education  at 13.1. The last eight rows of 
Table 1 report  the  fraction  in  each  census  affected  by  child  labor and 
compulsory  attendance  laws  (coded  as  SOB CSLs).  We discuss  these 
variables in detail in Section 5 below. 
4.2 OLS ESTIMATES 
OLS estimates  of private returns are similar to those reported elsewhere, 
and do not change  much with  controls  for average schooling.  For exam- 
ple,  the  estimates  show  a marked  increase  in schooling  coefficients  be- 
tween  1980 and  1990. This can be  seen  in Table 2,  which  reports  OLS 
estimates  for men  aged  40-49  from models  with  and without  Sft, using 
13. Only  1% samples  are  used  for  the  calculation  of  averages.  Alternative  weighting 
schemes  for measures  of average schooling  (e.g.,  unweighted)  generated similar results. 24 *  ACEMOGLU & ANGRIST 
Table 1  DESCRIPTIVE  STATISTICS 
QOB Samples 
Variables  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990 
Covariates 
Age 
Individual  education 
44.16  44.55  44.74  44.66  44.10 
(2.87)  (2.88)  (2.90)  (2.94)  (2.84) 
9.67  10.52  11.59  12.62  13.70 
(3.40)  (3.22)  (3.18)  (2.98)  (2.49) 
Regressors 
State average  education 
Lowest  state average 
education 
Highest  state average 
education 
Dependent Variable 
Log weekly  wage 
9.94  10.65  11.52  12.46  13.10 





















4.06  4.64  5.17  5.90  6.44 
(0.77)  (0.63)  (0.65)  (0.72)  (0.73) 
Instruments 
Percent child labor 6 
Percent child labor 7 
Percent child labor 8 
Percent child labor 9+ 
Percent compulsory 
attendance  8 
Percent compulsory 
attendance  9 
Percent compulsory 
attendance  10 
Percent compulsory 












0.40  0.53 
0.02  0.06 
0.01  0.07 
16659  72344  161029  376479  103184 
Notes:  Standard  deviations are in parentheses. Bracketed  entries in the "Lowest  state average educa- 
tion"  and "highest  state average  education"  rows are abbreviations  indicating  the state with the lowest 
and highest average schooling. All other entries are means. The data are from the Census IPUMS  for 
























0.39 Table 2  OLS ESTIMATES  OF PRIVATE AND  EXTERNAL RETURNS TO SCHOOLING 
1960-1980  1950-1980  1950-1990  1950  1960  1970  1980  1990 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 












0.075  0.055  0.069  0.076  0.075  0.102 
(0.0003)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Yes  N  No  No  No 




























0.055  0.068  0.075  0.074  0.102 
(0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
0.136  0.136  0.128  0.160  0.168 
(0.017)  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.047) 
No  Noo  No  No 
16,659  72,344  161,029  376,479  103,184 
Notes: Standard errors corrected  for state-year  clustering  are shown  in parentheses.  The data are from the Census  IPUMS for 1950 through  1990, with  the 
sample  restricted to white  males  aged 40-49  in the Census  year.  All regressions  contain  Census-year,  year-of-birth,  and state-of-birth main effects. 26 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
pooled  samples,  and separately  by census  year. The pooled  regressions 
include  state-of-residence  effects,  year effects,  year-of-birth effects,  and 
state-of-birth  effects.  All standard  errors reported  in the paper  are cor- 
rected  for  state-year  clustering  using  the  formula  in  Moulton  (1986). 
Corrected  standard  errors  are  typically  twice  as  large  as  uncorrected 
standard  errors because  of  the  group  structure  of  some  of  the  instru- 
ments  and regressors. 
OLS estimates  of external returns for 1960-1980  imply that a one-year 
increase in state average  schooling  is associated  with  a 0.073 increase  in 
the wages  of all workers  in that state.  Using  data from 1950-1980  gener- 
ates  an  estimate  of  0.061,  whereas  the  1950-1990  sample  leads  to  an 
estimated  external  return of 0.072.  These  are similar to Moretti's (1999) 
estimates  of  external  returns  using  within-city  variation,  which  range 
from 0.08 to 0.13.14  These OLS estimates  of external returns are large, but 
substantially  smaller than the external returns required to rationalize the 
relationship  in Figure 1. 
Interestingly, the external returns estimates  from using single censuses 
are considerably  larger than  the estimates  that control  for state effects. 
This suggests  that at least part of the relationship between  average school- 
ing and wages  is due to omitted state characteristics. The remainder of the 
paper presents  evidence  on whether  the association  between  state aver- 
age schooling  and wages  reflects human-capital  externalities. 
5.  Compulsory  Schooling  Laws  and  Schooling 
5.1 CONSTRUCTION  OF CSL  VARIABLES 
The  CSL  instruments  were  coded  from  information  on  five  types  of 
restrictions  related  to school  attendance  and work permits  that were  in 
force  at the  time  census  respondents  were  aged  14. These  restrictions 
specify  the  maximum  age  for school  enrollment  (enroll_age),  the  mini- 
mum  dropout  age  (drop_age),  the  minimum  schooling  required  before 
dropping  out (req-sch), the minimum  age for a work permit (work_age), 
and  the  minimum  schooling  required  for  a  work  permit  (worksch). 
Information was  collected  for 3-6-year  intervals  from 1914 to 1965, with 
missing  years  interpolated  by  extending  older  data.  For example,  data 
for cohorts  aged  14 in 1924-1928  come  from a source  for 1924. Sources 
for the CSLs are documented  in Appendix  B. 
The five CSLs vary considerably  over time and across states.  This can 
be seen  in Table 3, which  reports the mean  and standard  deviation  for 
14. Rauch  (1993)  reports  cross-section  estimates  around  0.05  using  data  from  the  1980 
Census.  These  estimates  are not directly comparable with ours because  Rauch's model 
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Table  3  DESCRIPTION  OF CHILD  LABOR  AND COMPULSORY 
SCHOOLING  LAWS 
Required 
Earliest  Latest  Minimum  Schooling 
Dropout  Enrollment  Schooling  Earliest  for Work 
Year  at Age 14  Age  Age  for Dropout  Work  Age  Permit 





































































































































Notes:  Standard  deviations are in parentheses. All other entries are means. The data are from the 
Census IPUMS  for 1950  through  1990,  with the sample  restricted  to white men aged 40-49 in the Census 
year. See Appendix  B for sources  and method. 
each CSL component  in the years for which  we have CSL data. Statistics 
in  the  table  are averages  using  micro  data; that  is,  they  weight  state 
requirements  using the sample distribution  of states for each cohort. The 
data  show  that  compulsory  attendance  requirements  have  generally 
been growing  more restrictive, with the maximum  enrollment  age falling 28 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
and  the  minimum  dropout  age  rising.  The minimum  age for work  has 
also increased.  The cross-section  variability in age requirements  for drop- 
out and work permits has also fallen over time. 
Margo and Finegan (1996) show  that in the 1900s child labor laws were 
at least  as  important  as  attendance  restrictions  for educational  attain- 
ment,  and  the  evidence  in Schmidt  (1996) suggests  the  same  for 1920- 
1935.15  This is probably because  the main reason  for leaving  school  was 
to work.  We therefore  combine  the five CSL components  into two vari- 
ables, one summarizing  compulsory  attendance laws and one summariz- 
ing  child  labor laws.  Compulsory  attendance  laws  are summarized  as 
the minimum  years required before leaving  school,  taking account of age 
requirements.  This is the  larger of schooling  required  before  dropping 
out and the difference  between  the minimum  dropout  age and the maxi- 
mum  enrollment  age: 
CA = max {reqsch;  drop-age  -  enroll-age}. 
Similarly,  child  labor  laws  are summarized  as  the  minimum  years  in 
school  required before work was  permitted.  This is the larger of school- 
ing required before receiving  a work permit and the difference between 
the minimum  work age and the maximum  enrollment  age: 
CL = max {work_sch; work_age  -  enroll_age}. 
These  variables  collapse  the  CSLs  into  two  measures  that  are highly 
related to educational  attainment both conceptually  and empirically. 
Over 95 percent  in the sample  of men  aged 40-49  have  CL in the 6-9 
range, while  CA is concentrated  in the 8-12  range, with almost no one in 
the 11 category. The distribution  of CL and CA can therefore be captured 
using  four dummies  for each variable. For CL, the dummies  are: 
CL6  for  CL ?  6, 
CL7  for  CL =  7, 
CL8  for  CL =  8, 
CL9  for  CL  9. 
Similarly, for CA, the dummies  are: 
15. Edwards  (1978), Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982), Lang and Kropp (1986), and Angrist and 
Krueger (1991) also present evidence  that compulsory  schooling  laws affected schooling. How  Large  Are  Human-Capital  Externalities?  ?  29 
CA8  for  CA c  8, 
CA9  for  CA  =  9, 
CA10  for  CA  =  10, 
CAll  for  CA  11. 
Table 1 shows  the fraction of individuals  in our sample  in each group 
when  CL and CA are assigned  according  to the laws  that were  in effect 
in individuals'  state of birth at the  time  they  were  14 (i.e.,  SOB CSLs). 
The distribution  of SOR CSLs is similar. In the empirical work,  the omit- 
ted  categories  are the  least  restrictive  groups  for CL and CA,  viz.  CL6 
and CA8. 
5.2 CSL  EFFECTS  ON INDIVIDUAL  SCHOOLING 
There is a large and statistically significant relationship between  individ- 
ual schooling  and  the CSL dummies.  Results  for men  aged  40-49  with 
SOB CSLs are shown  in Tables 4 and 5. Results  using  SOR CSLs and/or 
men  aged 30-39  are similar, and are omitted  to save space. 
Table 4 reports estimates  from regressions  of individual  schooling  on 
CL7-CL9  and CA9-CA11,  along  with  controls  for Census-year  effects, 
year-of-birth effects,  and state-of-birth effects.  For example,  the entry in 
column  1 shows  that in the 1950-1980  sample,  men born in states with a 
child  labor  law  that  required  9 years  in  school  before  allowing  work 
ended  up with  0.26 more years of school  completed  than those  born in 
states  that required  6 or fewer  years.  The results  are similar in models 
that do not include  state-of-residence  effects. 
The right half of Table 4 shows  that adding  1950 Census  data to the 
sample  leads  to  CSL effects  similar  to  or  slightly  smaller  than  those 
estimated  in the 1960-1980  data alone.  Incorporating both 1950 and 1990 
data  leads  to  larger effects.  Also,  the  relationship  between  CSLs and 
schooling  is  larger and  more  precisely  estimated  in  samples  that pool 
three or more censuses  than in a sample  using  1980 data only. For exam- 
ple,  column  4 shows  that with  1980 data alone,  the effect of CL9, though 
still statistically significant,  falls to 0.17. 
Overall,  the estimates  reflect a pattern consistent  with  the notion  that 
more restrictive laws caused higher educational  attainment.  This pattern 
can be seen  in Figures 2 and 3, which  plot differences  in the probability 
that educational  attainment  equals  or exceeds  the grade level  on the X- 
axis  (i.e.,  one  minus  the  CDF).  The  differences  are between  men  ex- 
posed  to different  CSLs in the  1960-1980  sample,  with  men  exposed  to 
the least restrictive CSLs as the reference  group. 
Figure 2 shows  that men  exposed  to more restrictive child labor laws Table 4  THE EFFECT  OF STATE-OF-BIRTH  COMPULSORY SCHOOLING  LAWS ON  INDIVIDUAL SCHOOLING 
Including State-of-Residence  Controls  Without State-of-Residence  Controls 
1960-1980  1950-1980  1950-1990  1980  1960-1980  1950-1980  1950-1990  1980 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
(a) Child Labor  Laws 
CL7  0.095  0.117  0.173  0.050  0.105  0.115  0.175  0.062 
(0.030)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.041)  (0.077)  (0.051)  (0.043)  (0.041) 
CL8  0.124  0.130  0.213  0.132  0.120  0.119  0.202  0.143 
(0.034)  (0.032)  (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.093)  (0.075)  (0.059)  (0.034) 
CL9  0.259  0.220  0.398  0.167  0.269  0.225  0.410  0.182 
(0.039)  (0.038)  (0.028)  (0.041)  (0.098)  (0.084)  (0.059)  (0.041) 
(b) Compulsory  Attendance Laws 
CA8  0.117  0.083  0.189  -0.011  0.103  0.068  0.171  -0.009 
(0.027)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.034)  (0.072)  (0.057)  (0.043)  (0.034) 
CA9  0.095  0.059  0.113  0.100  0.106  0.074  0.133  0.104 
(0.034)  (0.036)  (0.020)  (0.044)  (0.085)  (0.077)  (0.063)  (0.045) 
CA10  0.167  0.144  0.260  0.115  0.184  0.165  0.290  0.119 
(0.038)  (0.036)  (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.103)  (0.085)  (0.063)  (0.038) 
N  609,852  626,511  729,695  376,479  609,852  626,511  729,695  376,479 
Notes: Standard errors corrected  for state-year  clustering  are shown  in parentheses.  The data are from the Census  IPUMS for 1950 through  1990, with  the 
sample  restricted to white  males  aged 40-49  in the Census  year. All regressions  contain  Census-year,  year-of-birth,  and state-of-birth  main effects.  Compul- 
sory schooling  laws  were assigned  according  to the laws  in effect in the individual's  state of birth when  he was  14. Table 5  THE EFFECT  OF STATE-OF-BIRTH  COMPULSORY SCHOOLING  LAWS ON DISCRETE LEVELS OF SCHOOLING 
Resultsfor 1960-1980  Resultsfor 1950-1980 
Completed  Completed  Completed  Completed  Completed  Completed  Completed  Completed  Completed  Completed 
8 Years  10 Years  12 Years  14 Years  16 Years  8 Years  10 Years  12 Years  14 Years  16 Years 
or Higher  or Higher  or Higher  or Higher  or Higher  or Higher  or Higher  or Higher  or Higher  or Higher 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Dependent-  0.908  0.747  0.617  0.249  0.167  0.884  0.695  0.562  0.226  0.151 
variable 
mean 
(a) Child Labor  Laws 
CL7  0.019  0.019  0.014  -0.005  -0.005  0.031  0.014  0.009  -0.004  -0.004 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
CL8  0.032  0.023  0.018  -0.014  -0.014  0.033  0.019  0.016  -0.009  -0.010 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.046)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
CL9  0.061  0.045  0.035  -0.019  -0.018  0.065  0.034  0.024  -0.021  -0.007 
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.052)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.004) 
(b) Compulsory  Attendance Laws 
CA8  0.036  0.014  0.010  -0.009  -0.011  0.032  0.010  0.006  -0.010  -0.010 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003) 
CA9  0.020  0.023  0.025  -0.011  -0.008  0.016  0.022  0.022  -0.011  -0.009 
(0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005) 
CA10  0.030  0.034  0.037  -0.013  -0.009  0.022  0.032  0.032  -0.010  -0.005 
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005) 
Notes: Standard errors corrected for state-year  clustering  are shown  in parentheses.  All entries  are OLS estimates  from a regression  of a dummy  for having  completed 
the indicated  year of schooling  on child-labor-law  or compulsory-attendance-law  dummies.  All regressions  also contain Census-year,  year-of-birth,  state-of-birth,  and 
state-of-residence  main effects.  The data are from the Census  IPUMS for 1950 through  1980, with  the sample  restricted  to white  males  aged  40-49  in the Census  year. 
Compulsory  schooling  laws were assigned  according  to the laws  in effect in the individual's  state of birth when  he was  14. The sample  size for the 1960-1980  columns 
is 609,852; the sample  size  for the 1950-1980  columns  is 626,511. 32 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
Figure  2 CDF  DIFFERENCE  BY  SEVERITY  OF CHILD  LABOR  LAWS 
(1-CDF)  difference 
0.07 - 
0.06 - 
0.06  / 
0.04  / 
/  \ 
0.03-  /  \ 
0.02 - 
0.01 -X  / 
0 00  .  .....  - -....  ..............  .  ..  .....  ..  .  ........  ......  ...  ....... 
0.01 
-0.02  i  _ 
-0.03  - 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17 
Highest grade completed 
Schooling  required  to work 
7 years  ---  8 years  -----  9 or more 
The figure shows  the difference  in the probability of schooling  greater than or equal to the grade level on 
the X-axis. The reference group  is 6 or fewer years of required schooling. 
were  1-6  percentage  points  more  likely  to  complete  grades  8-12.  For 
example,  the top curve in Figure 2 shows  that a person  growing  up in a 
state with  the  most  restrictive  child  labor laws  was  about 6 percentage 
points  more likely  to have  completed  8th grade than  a person  growing 
up with the least restrictive child labor laws.  These differences  decline  at 
lower  grades,  and  drop  off  sharply  after grade  12.  Figure  3 shows  a 
similar pattern  for compulsory  attendance  laws.  These  figures  are en- 
couraging  in that they suggest  that CSLs primarily shift the distribution 
of schooling  in middle-  and high-school  grades.  This is consistent  with 
the  notion  that  CSLs  caused  schooling  changes,  and  not  vice  versa. 
Also,  correlation  between  CSLs  and  omitted  factors  related  to 
macroeconomic  conditions,  tastes  for schooling,  or family  background 
would  likely result in an association  between  more restrictive CSLs and How  Large  Are  Human-Capital  Externalities?  *  33 
Figure 3 CDF DIFFERENCE  BY SEVERITY  OF COMPULSORY  ATTENDANCE 
LAWS 
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The figure shows  the difference  in the probability of schooling  at greater than or equal to the grade level 
on the X-axis. The reference group is 8 or fewer years of required schooling. 
the proportion  of the population  attending  college.16 Therefore,  Figures 
2 and  3 suggest  that CSLs are not  correlated  with  omitted  factors that 
affected  schooling  across the board. 
Table 5 quantifies  the CDF differences  plotted  in the figures for 1960- 
1980 and  shows  analogous  results  for the  1950-1980  sample.  The table 
reports CSL coefficients in regressions  of dummy variables for whether  an 
individual  completed  the level of schooling  indicated in the column head- 
ing.  All of the positive  estimates  for grades  8-12  are statistically  signifi- 
cant. The negative  estimates  at schooling  levels  above 12 are smaller and 
16. Up to 12th grade, the CSLs increase schooling  above required levels.  For example,  CL9 
makes  high-school  graduation  more likely. This may  reflect "lumpiness"  of schooling 
decisions,  peer effects,  or the fact that our coding  is imperfect.  Lang and Kropp (1986) 
note  that educational  sorting  might  also  lead  people  not  affected  directly by CSLs to 
change  their schooling  when  CSLs change. Table 6  2SLS ESTIMATES OF PRIVATE RETURNS TO SCHOOLING 
CSL Instruments 
QOB Instruments  SOB-CL Instruments  SOB-CA Instruments 
1960-1980  1980  1960-1970  1960-1980  1950-1980  1950-1990  1960-1980  1950-1980  1950-1990 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Including state-of-  0.073  0.090  0.063  0.076  0.103  0.113  0.092  0.099  0.081 
residence  main  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.034)  (0.038)  (0.018)  (0.044)  (0.052)  (0.023) 
effects 
No state-of-residence  0.073  0.088  0.063  0.080  0.112  0.126  0.101  0.094  0.100 
main effects  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.064)  (0.060)  (0.027)  (0.088)  (0.086)  (0.040) 
N  609,852  376,479  233,373  609,852  626,511  729,695  609,852  626,511  729,695 
Notes: Standard errors corrected  for state-year  clustering  are in parentheses.  All entries  are two-stage  least-squares  estimates  of private  returns to schooling, 
using the excluded  instruments  indicated  above and discussed  in the text. The data are from the Census  IPUMS for 1950 through  1990, with the sample restricted 
to white  males  aged  40-49  in the Census  year.  QOB refers to the  set  of 30 dummies  interacting  quarter of birth and year of birth.  SOB-CL refers to a set of 
dummies  indicating  state- and year-specific  child labor laws  assigned  according  to the laws  in effect in the individual's  state of birth when  he was  14. SOB-CA 
refers to a set of dummies  indicating  state- and year-specific  compulsory  attendance  laws assigned  according to the laws in effect in the individual's  state of birth 
when  he was  14. All models  contain  Census-year,  year-of-birth,  and state-of-birth  main effects. How  Large  Are  Human-Capital  Externalities?  *  35 
less  likely  to be  significant.  The estimates  also  suggest  that child  labor 
laws  shifted  the  distribution  of schooling  at younger  grades  more than 
compulsory  attendance  laws  did.  This  too  is  consistent  with  a causal 
interpretation of the relationship between  CSLs and schooling,  since child 
labor laws  refer to lower  schooling  levels  than  compulsory  attendance 
laws.  Interestingly,  we  replicate Margo and Finegan's  (1996) finding  for 
the 1900s that child labor laws were more important for educational attain- 
ment than compulsory  attendance  laws. 
For the most part, the CDF differences  in the figures and in Table 5 are 
ordered by increasing  severity, as would  be expected  if these  differences 
reflect increasingly  restrictive laws.  For example,  using  1960-1980  data, 
the difference  at grade 9 for men with CL9 = 1 exceeds  the difference  for 
men with CL8 =  1. This in turn exceeds  the difference  for men with CL7 
=  1. Adding  1950 data leaves  this pattern unchanged.17 
5.3 PRIVATE  RETURNS  TO EDUCATION 
The CSL instruments  are an important determinant  of individual  school- 
ing, so in principle they can be used as instruments  for individual  school- 
ing in wage  equations.  On the other hand,  if there are external returns to 
schooling,  IV estimates  of private returns using  CSL instruments  will be 
biased by correlation between  the instruments  and state average school- 
ing.  In fact, one  simple  test for external returns is to compare  estimates 
using  quarter-of-birth instruments,  which  are uncorrelated with average 
education,  to estimates  using  CSL instruments. 
Table 6 reports two-stage  least-squares  (2SLS) estimates  of the private 
returns to schooling  using  three different  sets of instruments.  Using  30 
quarter-of-birth  dummies  (i.e.,  3  quarter-of-birth  dummies  separately 
for each year of birth), the private return to schooling  is estimated  to be 
0.073 (with  a standard error of 0.012). This is less  than the Angrist  and 
Krueger (1991) estimate from a similar specification  using  1980 data only. 
Columns  2 and 3 show  that the discrepancy  is explained  by the fact that 
1960 and  1970 data generate  smaller quarter-of-birth estimates  than the 
1980 sample.18 
17. A final noteworthy  feature  of the figures is their similarity  to CDF  differences  induced 
by quarter  of birth (as reported in Angrist and Imbens, 1995). Like CSLs, quarter  of 
birth changes the distribution  of schooling primarily  in the 8-12 grade range. This 
supports our claim that CSL instruments  and quarter-of-birth  instruments  are likely 
to generate similar estimates of the private return to schooling, since, as explained 
in Appendix A.2, IV estimates implicitly  weight individual causal effects using CDF 
differences. 
18. Bound, Jaeger,  and Baker (1995) note that with many instruments, 2SLS estimates 
may be biased towards OLS estimates, and argue that this is a problem for some of 
the specifications reported by Angrist and Krueger (1991). However, reanalyses of 36 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
Estimates  of private  returns  using  CSL instruments  in the  1960-1980 
sample  exceed  those  using  quarter-of-birth instruments,  though  the dif- 
ferences  are not  large  or statistically  significant.  The 2SLS estimate  of 
private returns using  CL6-CL8  as instruments,  reported in column  4, is 
0.076  (s.e.  =  0.034).  Using  CA8-CA10  generates  an  estimate  of  0.092 
(s.e.=0.044),  shown  in column  7. Models  estimated  using  CSL instru- 
ments without  state-of-residence  effects produce  similar results. This last 
point is worth noting,  since state of residence  is a potentially  endogenous 
variable. 
The  fact  that  quarter-of-birth  and  CSL instruments  generate  similar 
schooling  coefficients  in the 1960-1980  data already  suggests  that exter- 
nal returns are modest  in this period.  As noted  above,  significant  exter- 
nal  returns  would  likely  lead  to  estimates  of  private  returns  that  are 
biased  upwards  when  using  CSL instruments,  since CSLs are correlated 
with  average  schooling.  2SLS estimates  using  quarter-of-birth  instru- 
ments  are not subject to this bias. 
Estimates  that include  data from 1950 and  1990 use  only  CSL instru- 
ments,  and not  quarter of birth.  Adding  1950 data to the basic sample 
leads  to somewhat  larger estimates  with  CL instruments.  Adding  1990 
data as well  leads to even  larger estimates  using  CL instruments,  and to 
a substantial  increase in precision  with both sets of instruments.  On the 
other hand,  the estimates  using  CA instruments  are remarkably insensi- 
tive to the inclusion  of 1950 and 1990 data. 
Finally, it is noteworthy  that the IV estimates  using  quarter of birth are 
very close to the OLS estimates  for the same period; compare,  for exam- 
ple, the estimates  of 0.073 in column  1 of Table 5 and column  1 of Table 2. 
Thus,  estimates  of  external  returns  that  treat  individual  schooling  as 
exogenous  and endogenous  should  give  similar results,  at least for the 
1960-1980  sample. 
6. External  Returns  to Education 
6.1  RESULTS  FOR 1960-1980 
Table 7 reports estimates  of external returns to education  using  data for 
1960-1980.  The bottom  panel  of Table 7 shows  the  first-stage  relation- 
ship  between  SOB-CSL dummies  and  average schooling  in  1960-1980 
these  data  by,  among  others,  Chamberlain  and  Imbens  (1996),  Staiger  and  Stock 
(1997), and Angrist  and Krueger (1995) suggest  that using  3 quarter-of-birth dummies 
interacted  with  10 year-of-birth  dummies  as instruments  produces  approximately  un- 
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data.  These  first-stage  equations  include  year,  year-of-birth,  state-of- 
birth,  and  state-of-residence  dummies.  CSL  effects  are  identified  in 
these  models  because  cohorts  born in different  years  in the  same  state 
were  exposed  to  different  laws.  The  effect  of  SOB-CSL dummies  on 
average  schooling  is  similar  to,  though  typically  somewhat  smaller 
than,  the  corresponding  effect  on  individual  schooling  reported  in Ta- 
ble  4.  A  moderately  weaker  relationship  is  not  surprising,  since  the 
average  schooling  variables refer to a broader group than our sample  of 
white  men in their 40s. 
The IV estimates  reported  in the top half of the  table are from mod- 
els  that treat both  si and  Sjt as endogenous.  Using  quarter of birth and 
child  labor  laws  as  instruments  generates  a  private  return  of  0.074 
(s.e.  =  0.012) and an external return of 0.003 (with s.e.  = 0.040). This is 
considerably  smaller,  though  less  precise,  than the corresponding  OLS 
estimate  of  external  returns.  The  90% confidence  interval  for external 
returns,  [-0.065,  0.066],  excludes  the  OLS estimate  of 0.073 (see  Table 
2). Using  compulsory  attendance  laws  as instruments  generates  some- 
what  higher  external returns.  These  are not  significantly  different  from 
the  corresponding  OLS estimates,  but  still considerably  lower  at 0.017 
(s.e.  =  0.043). 
Using  both  sets  of  CSL dummies  as  instruments  generates  a more 
precisely  estimated  external return of 0.004 (s.e.  = 0.035). The 90% confi- 
dence  interval for this estimate  is [-0.053,  0.061],  which  again excludes 
the  OLS estimate.  Finally, column  4 reports results  using  both  CL and 
CA  dummies,  and  a full  set  of  interactions  between  them,  as  instru- 
ments.  This  is  useful  because  child  labor and  compulsory  attendance 
laws  may work together  to encourage  students  to stay in school  longer. 
The results  in this case are slightly  more precise  than estimates  that do 
not  use  the  interaction  terms as instruments,  showing  external returns 
of 0.005 with  standard error of 0.033. 
Earlier we  argued that it is important to use the "right" private return 
to adjust for individual  schooling  when  estimating  external returns.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  IV estimates  of private  returns  in columns  1-4  of 
Table 7 are remarkably  close  to  the  OLS estimates  of  private  returns 
reported in Table 2. This suggests  that estimates  of external returns from 
models  that treat individual  schooling  as exogenous  may not be biased. 
Columns  5-8  in Table 7 report estimates  from models  that treat individ- 
ual schooling  as exogenous  and  drop  the  quarter-of-birth instruments. 
The resulting  estimates  of external returns again offer little evidence  of 
external  returns,  and  are virtually  indistinguishable  from those  in col- 
umns  1-4,  though  slightly more precise. Since treating individual  school- 
ing as exogenous  has little effect on the estimates,  the results  presented Table 7  2SLS ESTIMATES OF PRIVATE AND  EXTERNAL RETURNS TO SCHOOLING-STATE-OF-BIRTH 
INSTRUMENTS, 1960-1980  AND  MEN AGED 40-49 
Individual Schooling Endogenous  Individual Schooling Exogenous 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Second-Stage  Estimates 
Instrument  set  QOB  QOB  QOB,  QOB, 
& CL  & CA  A & CL  CA & CL, 
interactions 
CL  CA  CL  QOB, 






0.074  0.074  0.075 
(0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
0.003  0.017  0.004 





0.073  0.073  0.073 
(0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 
0.002  0.018  0.006 











0.128  0.102 
(0.026)  (0.023) 
0.122  0.104 
(0.030)  (0.029) 
0.144  0.094 













0.128  0.104 
(0.026)  (0.030) 
0.122  0.104 
(0.030)  (0.029) 
0.143  0.094 
(0.038)  (0.036) 
Notes:  Standard  errors  corrected  for state-year clustering  are  reported  in parentheses.  All entries  are two-stage  least-squares  estimates  of returns  to schooling, 
using the excluded instruments  indicated  above and discussed in the text. QOB refers  to a set of dummies interacting  quarter  of birth  and year  of birth. CL 
refers  to a set of dummies indicating  state- and year-specific  child labor  laws. CA refers  to a set of dummies indicating  state- and year-specific  compulsory 
attendance  laws. These  are  assigned according  to the laws in effect  in the individual's  state  of birth  when he was 14. The data  are  from  the Census IPUMS  for 
1960  through  1980,  with the sample  restricted  to white males aged 40-49 in the Census year.  All regressions  contain  Census-year,  year-of-birth,  state-of-birth, 












CAll 40 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
in the  rest of the paper  are from models  where  individual  schooling  is 
not instrumented. 
Overall,  the  results  in  Table 7 suggest  that  the  association  between 
state average  schooling  and wages  found  in Table 2 is unlikely  to be due 
to human-capital  externalities  alone.  Furthermore,  they  indicate  a total 
social  return  of  around  8-9%  (7% private  return  plus  1-2%  external 
return).  This  is  clearly  too  small  to  rationalize  the  steep  relationship 
between  average  schooling  and  output  per worker  found  in Figure  1. 
6.2 ADDITIONAL  ESTIMATES  USING  1960-1980  DATA 
Estimates of external returns using  child labor laws as instruments  (CL7- 
CL9) change  little  when  the  basic  specification  is  modified.  The  first 
column  of  Table 8 shows  the  results  of  allowing  the  private  return to 
schooling  to vary by  census  year. Time-varying  returns may be impor- 
tant, since the literature on wage  inequality  suggests  the private returns 
to  schooling  have  been  changing  (see,  e.g.,  Katz and  Murphy,  1992). 
Imposing  a constant  private return across years may lead to misleading 
estimates  of  external  returns.  In practice,  allowing  private  returns  to 
vary  by  year  generates  an  estimated  external  return  of  0.007  (s.e.  = 
0.036)  with  CL instruments,  close  to  the  baseline  estimate  in  Table 7. 
Allowing  private  returns  to  vary  by  state  as  well  as  year  generates  a 
negative  external return of  -0.024  (s.e.  =  0.039),  reported  in column  2. 
The corresponding  estimates  using  compulsory  attendance  instruments, 
reported in the bottom  panel of Table 8, are 0.021 and  -0.018. 
Many of the studies  in Card's (1999) survey  of research on the returns 
to schooling  report IV estimates  that exceed  OLS estimates.  To illustrate 
the  consequences  of  a higher  private  return  for estimates  of  external 
returns,  Table 8 also shows  estimated  external returns from models  im- 
posing  a private  return  of  0.08  or  0.09  (i.e.,  using  Yijt -  0.08s,  or  Yit  - 
0.09si as the dependent  variable).  Not  surprisingly,  the estimated  exter- 
nal returns  in this  case  are even  smaller  than  the baseline  estimates  in 
Table 7. With private  returns of 9%, for example,  the external  return is 
estimated  to be  -0.018  (s.e.  =  0.039)  with  SOB-CL instruments,  and 
0.010 (s.e.  =  0.043) with  SOB-CA instruments. 
Columns  5-7  of  Table 8 show  external  return  estimates  using  SOR 
CSLs as instruments  for state  average  schooling  instead  of SOB CSLs. 
These  estimates  are of interest  in that,  as noted  in Section  3,  they  are 
less  subject to bias from endogenous  migration.  Column  5 reports esti- 
mates  corresponding  to those  in Table 7, while  columns  6 and 7 are for 
models  allowing  private  returns to vary by year and by state and year. 
The CL estimates  are larger using SOR CSLs, while  the CA estimates  are How  Large  Are  Human-Capital  Externalities?  *  41 
smaller.  The differences  are not large enough,  however,  to suggest  sig- 
nificant bias due to migration  when  using  SOB-CSL instruments.19 
6.3 ADDING  1950  AND 1990  DATA 
Individual  schooling  must be treated as exogenous  in analyses  using 1950 
and 1990 data since there is no quarter-of-birth information  in these  data 
sets. In principle, this may lead to biased estimates,  though  in practice the 
estimates  of  external  returns  for  1960-1980  are  not  sensitive  to  the 
exogeneity  assumption.  A second  and potentially  more serious problem 
is that schooling  is a categorical variable  in the  1990 Census,  different 
from  the  earlier highest-grade-completed  measure.  We must  therefore 
use  an imputed  years-of-schooling  measure  for 1990. 
Table 9 reports estimates  of external returns in the extended  samples 
(still for men  aged 40-49).  Using  child labor laws  as instruments  gener- 
ates small positive  or zero estimates  of external returns with  1950-1980 
data. These estimates  are more precise  than those  using  1960-1980  data 
only.  In column  1,  for example,  the  estimated  external  return is 0.009 
with  a standard error of 0.025. As before,  using  compulsory  attendance 
laws  as instruments  leads  to somewhat  larger estimates.  But these  esti- 
mates  are less  precise  than  those  using  CL instruments,  and  the  first- 
stage relationships  are not uniformly  consistent  with a causal interpreta- 
tion of the correlation between  these  CSLs and schooling.  For example, 
in column  1, CA9 has a larger coefficient than either CA10 or CAll. 
In contrast with  the  results  using  1950-1980  data,  adding  data from 
the  1990 Census  leads  to  statistically  significant  positive  estimates  of 
external returns when  child labor laws are used  as instruments.  Column 
2 shows  an external return of 0.048 with  a standard error of 0.02. Allow- 
ing separate private returns by census  year leads to an even larger exter- 
nal return of 0.074 with the CL instruments.  In contrast, CA instruments 
do not generate significant  estimates  of external returns in the 1950-1990 
sample.  Results  using  SOR CSLs in the expanded  samples  are reported 
in Table 10. These  show  small  and  insignificant  external  returns in the 
1950-1980  sample,  but-as  in Table 9-some  of the estimates  using  CL 
instruments  in the 1950-1990  sample  are positive  and significant. 
The relatively  large and significant  external return estimates  using  CL 
instruments  in 1950-1990  data may signal a change in the external value 
19. Another  possible  source  of bias in the estimates  in Tables 7 and 8 is changing  school 
quality.  But school  quality  is  associated  with  higher  average  wages,  so  omission  of 
these  variables  cannot  be  responsible  for the  apparent  lack of  an  external  return  to 
education.  In  fact,  controlling  for  the  school  quality  variables  used  by  Card  and 
Krueger  (1992b) leads  to more  negative  estimates,  though  also  less  precise,  than  re- 
ported  in Table 7. Table 8  2SLS ESTIMATES OF EXTERNAL RETURNS TO SCHOOLING: ADDITIONAL  RESULTS FOR 
MEN AGED 40-49 
With  State-of-Birth  Instruments  With  State-of-Residence  Instruments 
Private  Private 
Private  Returns  Private  Returns 
Returns  Separate  Private  Private  Returns  Separate 
Separate  by Census  Returns  Returns  Baseline  Separate  by Census 
by Census  and  State  =0.08  =0.09  Estimates  by Census  and  State 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
(a)  Results  Using  Child  Labor  Laws  as Instruments 
External return  0.007  -0.024 
to schooling  (0.039)  (0.039) 
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(0.058) (b) Results Using Compulsory  Attendance Laws as Instruments 
External return  0.021  -0.018  0.011  0.010  0.009  0.007  -0.031 
to schooling  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
First Stagefor State-Year  Average Schooling 
CA9  0.125  0.118  0.128  0.128  0.164  0.162  0.155 
(0.026)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.035) 
CA10  0.120  0.112  0.122  0.122  0.161  0.159  0.151 
(0.030)  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.055) 
CA11  0.141  0.134  0.143  0.143  0.207  0.205  0.199 
(0.037)  (0.034)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.055)  (0.054)  (0.051) 
(c) OLS Estimates 
External return  0.079  0.044  0.069  0.063  0.073  0.079  0.044 
to schooling  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Notes:  Standard  errors  corrected  for state-year clustering  are reported  in parentheses.  All entries are estimates of returns  to schooling, using dummies for 
child labor  laws or compulsory  attendance  laws as excluded  instruments.  The data  are from  the Census IPUMS.  The sample  is restricted  to white males aged 
40-49 in the Census year. All regressions  contain  individual-education,  Census-year,  year-of-birth,  state-of-birth,  and state-of-residence  main  effects. The first 
four columns use state-of-birth  child labor  laws or compulsory  attendance  laws as instruments,  which are assigned according  to the laws in effect in the 
individual's  state  of birth  when he was 14. The last four  columns  use state-of-residence  child labor  laws or compulsory  attendance  laws as instruments,  which 
are assigned  according  to the laws in effect in the individual's  state of residence  30 years ago. The sample size for all columns is 609,852. 44 *  ACEMOGLU & ANGRIST 
Table 9  2SLS ESTIMATES:  ADDITIONAL  SAMPLES WITH STATE-OF-BIRTH 
INSTRUMENTS FOR MEN AGED 40-49 
Separate  Private Returns 
Baseline  Results  By Census  By Census and State 
50-80  50-90  50-80  50-90  50-80  50-90 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(a) Results Using Child Labor  Laws as Instruments 
External  0.009  0.048  0.023  0.074 
return  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.025)  (0.019) 
First Stagefor State-Year Average Schooling 
0.173  0.165  0.170  0.162 
(0.024)  (0.019)  (0.023)  (0.019) 
0.126  0.144  0.123  0.139 
(0.036)  (0.027)  (0.035)  (0.027) 
0.278  0.333  0.275  0.327 
(0.039)  (0.026)  (0.039)  (0.026) 
(b) Results Using Compulsory  Attendance Laws as Instruments 
External  0.040  0.0006  0.053  0.038 
return  (0.038)  (0.027)  (0.039)  (0.027) 
First Stagefor State-Year Average Schooling 
0.133  0.172  0.130  0.168 
(0.028)  (0.019)  (0.027)  (0.019) 
0.106  0.167  0.105  0.164 
(0.037)  (0.028)  (0.036)  (0.027) 
0.096  0.182  0.095  0.178 
(0.042)  (0.029)  (0.041)  (0.028) 
(c) OLS Estimates 
External  0.061  0.072  0.076  0.094 
return  (0.009)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
N  626,510  729,695  626,510  729,695 
-0.034  0.041 
(0.025)  (0.021) 
0.158  0.145 
(0.020)  (0.016) 
0.113  0.121 
(0.031)  (0.022) 
0.250  0.280 
(0.034)  (0.022) 
0.017  -0.008 
(0.038)  (0.029) 
0.118  0.143 
(0.023)  (0.015) 
0.096  0.139 
(0.031)  (0.022) 
0.087  0.154 
(0.036)  (0.023) 
0.039  0.057 
(0.008)  (0.004) 
626,510  729,695 
Notes: Standard  errors  corrected  for  state-year  clustering  are reported  in  parentheses.  Estimates  of 
external returns to schooling  use dummies  for child labor and compulsory  attendance  laws as excluded 
instruments.  Individual  schooling  is treated as exogenous.  The sample is restricted to white  males aged 
40-49  in  the  Census  year.  All  regressions  contain  individual-schooling,  Census-year,  year-of-birth, 
state-of-birth,  and state-of-residence  main effects.  Compulsory  schooling  laws are assigned  according to 
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TABLE 10  2SLS ESTIMATES:  ADDITIONAL SAMPLES WITH STATE-OF- 
RESIDENCE INSTRUMENTS FOR MEN AGED 40-49 
Separate  Private  Separate  Private 
Returns  Returns 
Baseline  Results  by Census  by Census and State 
50-80  50-90  50-80  50-90  50-80  50-90 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(a) Results Using Child Labor  Laws as Instruments 
External  0.016  0.044  0.024  0.054  -0.007  0.016 
return  (0.028)  (0.022)  (0.028)  (0.022)  (0.026)  (0.023) 
First Stagefor State-Year Average Schooling 
CL7  0.215  0.185  0.213  0.183  0.202  0.174 
(0.035)  (0.031)  (0.035)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.027) 
CL8  0.142  0.128  0.142  0.127  0.134  0.116 
(0.054)  (0.045)  (0.054)  (0.044)  (0.049)  (0.039) 
CL9  0.430  0.452  0.426  0.449  0.401  0.409 
(0.068)  (0.048)  (0.067)  (0.047)  (0.061)  (0.043) 
(b) Results Using Compulsory  Attendance  Laws as Instruments 
External  0.007  -0.0004  0.014  0.020  -0.017  -0.029 
return  (0.045)  (0.032)  (0.046)  (0.031)  (0.043)  (0.033) 
First Stagefor State-Year Schooling 
CA9  0.192  0.247  0.190  0.244  0.177  0.218 
(0.043)  (0.030)  (0.042)  (0.030)  (0.038)  (0.026) 
CA10  0.147  0.198  0.145  0.195  0.137  0.171 
(0.075)  (0.056)  (0.074)  (0.056)  (0.067)  (0.049) 
CAll  0.145  0.254  0.143  0.251  0.136  0.229 
(0.063)  (0.046)  (0.063)  (0.045)  (0.057)  (0.040) 
(c) OLS Estimates 
External  0.061  0.072  0.076  0.094  0.038  0.057 
return  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
N  626,511  729,625  626,511  729,625  626,511  729,625 
Notes: Standard  errors  corrected  for state-year  clustering  are reported  in  parentheses.  Estimates  of 
external returns to schooling  use dummies  for child labor and compulsory  attendance  laws as excluded 
instruments.  Individual  schooling  is treated as exogenous.  The sample is restricted to white  males aged 
40-49  in  the  Census  year.  All  regressions  contain  individual-schooling,  Census-year,  year-of-birth, 
state-of-birth, and state-of-residence  main effects.  Compulsory  schooling  laws are assigned  according to 
the laws  in effect in the individual's  state of residence  30 years ago. 46 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
of human capital. But this result could also reflect the switch to a categori- 
cal schooling  variable in  1990. The econometric  discussion  in Section  3 
highlights  the possibility  of spurious  external-return estimates  when  the 
effect of individual  schooling  is poorly  controlled.  Measurement  error in 
the 1990 schooling  variable could  generate  a problem  of this type.20 
To check whether  measurement  problems  could be responsible  for the 
1950-1990  results,  we  assigned  mean  values  from the  1980 Census  to a 
categorical  schooling  variable available in the 1960, 1970, and 1980 Cen- 
suses.  This variable is similar to the categorical 1990 variable. We then re- 
estimated  external returns in 1960-1980,  treating the imputed  individual 
schooling  variable  as  exogenous.21  This  leads  to  markedly  larger  esti- 
mates  of  external  returns.  For example,  using  CL instruments  to esti- 
mate external returns with imputed  schooling  data generates  an external 
return  of  0.024  instead  of  the  estimate  of  0.003  reported  in  Table 7. 
Similarly, using  CA  instruments  generates  an  external  return  of  0.034 
instead  of 0.017 with  the better-measured  schooling  variable.  This sug- 
gests that the higher external returns estimated  with  1990 data are due to 
changes  in the education  variable in 1990. 
6.4 RESULTS  FOR  MEN AGED  30-39 
The last set of results is for men in their 30s. Since this group has a steep 
age-earnings  profile,  quarter  of  birth  is  confounded  with  age  effects 
(Angrist  and Krueger, 1991). Individual  schooling  is therefore treated as 
exogenous  in  this  younger  sample.  With  individual  schooling  exoge- 
nous,  1950 Census  data can be  included.  1990 data  are omitted,  how- 
ever, because  of the problems  discussed  above. 
Columns  1-3  of Table 11 reports results  for men  aged  30-39  in 1950- 
1980, while  results for a larger sample pooling  men aged 30-49  appear in 
columns  4-6.  The top panel  shows  results  using  CL instruments,  while 
the bottom  panel  is for CA instruments  (coded  as SOB CSLs). The first- 
stage  relationships  are also reported  in the table. They show  significant 
effects of CSLs on the average schooling  of men aged 30-39,  very similar 
to those  for men aged 40-49  reported in the bottom panel of Table 7. The 
baseline  estimate  using  CL instruments  in the younger  sample,  reported 
in column  1, is close to 0, with a standard error of 0.023. CA instruments 
20. Note, however, that the measurement  error  in the 1990  schooling variable  is not classi- 
cal. Kane, Rouse, and Staiger  (1999)  discuss the implications  of nonclassical  measure- 
ment error  for IV estimates. A detailed description  of the schooling  variables  used here 
appears in Appendix  B. 
21. This exercise  uses the IPUMS  variable  EDUCREC,  which provides a uniform  categori- 
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Table 11  2SLS ESTIMATES  OF EXTERNAL RETURNS TO SCHOOLING, 
1950-1980 
Aged 30-39  Aged 30-49 
Separate  Separate 
Separate  Private  Separate  Private 
Private  Returns  Private  Returns 
Baseline  Returns  by Census  Baseline  Returns  by Census 
Results  by Census  and State  Results  by Census  and State 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
(a) Results Using Child Labor  Laws as Instruments 
External  0.002  0.028  -0.018  0.011  0.030  -0.007 
return  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.023) 
First Stagefor State-Year Average Schooling 
CL7  0.070  0.069  0.067  0.128  0.125  0.116 
(0.030)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.019) 
CL8  0.137  0.133  0.123  0.136  0.132  0.121 
(0.037)  (0.037)  (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.040) 
CL9  0.284  0.278  0.254  0.285  0.279  0.252 
(0.037)  (0.037)  (0.031)  (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.024) 
(b) Results Using Compulsory  Attendance  Laws as Instruments 
External  -0.006  0.017  -0.030  0.022  0.041  -0.006 
return  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.030) 
First Stagefor State-Year Schooling 
CA9  0.202  0.198  0.180  0.162  0.158  0.142 
(0.027)  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.025)  (0.024)  (0.027) 
CA10  0.156  0.153  0.137  0.127  0.125  0.111 
(0.032)  (0.032)  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.020) 
CAll  0.230  0.225  0.205  0.161  0.157  0.142 
(0.039)  (0.039)  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.040) 
(c) OLS Estimates 
External  0.081  0.095  0.054  0.071  0.087  0.048 
return  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
N  812,864  812,864  812,864  1,439,375  1,439,375  1,439,375 
Notes:  The table  reports  results  for men aged 30-39 and a pooled sample  of men aged 30-49. Standard 
errors  corrected  for state-year clustering  are reported  in parentheses.  Estimates  of external  returns  to 
schooling use dummies for child labor and compulsory attendance  laws as excluded instruments. 
Individual schooling is treated as exogenous. All regressions contain individual-schooling,  Census- 
year, year-of-birth,  state-of-birth,  and state-of-residence  main effects as well as a quartic  function of 
potential experience.  Compulsory  schooling laws are assigned according  to the laws in effect in the 
individual's  state of birth  when he was 14. 48 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
generate  a less  precisely  estimated  external return of  -0.006.  Estimates 
that  allow  private  returns  to  vary  by  year  are larger, but  those  from 
models  allowing  private  return to vary by  state  and  year are negative. 
Pooling  age  groups  leads  to  similar  estimates.  Overall,  the  results  for 
men  aged  30-39  are consistent  with  the  results  for men  in  their  40s, 
showing  no  evidence  of  significant  external  returns.  Once  again,  the 
estimated  confidence  intervals  exclude  returns above  5-6% percent. 
7. Concluding  Remarks 
The  returns  to  education  are important  for both  economic  policy  and 
economic  theory. A large literature in labor economics  reports estimates 
of private returns to education  on the order of 6-10%.  However,  private 
returns may be only  part of the story. With positive  external returns to 
education,  private returns underestimate  the economic  value  of school- 
ing.  On  the  other  hand,  if education  plays  a major signaling  role,  the 
total economic  value  of schooling  may be less than suggested  by private 
returns. 
This paper exploits  potentially  exogenous  variation in average school- 
ing  caused  by  changes  in  compulsory  schooling  laws  in  U.S.  states. 
Census  data from 1960-1980  generate  statistically  insignificant  external- 
return estimates  around  1% (mostly  ranging  from  -1%  to 3%). Adding 
data  from  1950  leads  to  somewhat  more  precise  estimates,  without 
changing  the basic pattern.  Regressions  using  data from the  1990 Cen- 
sus,  in  contrast,  generate  statistically  significant  estimates  of  external 
returns of 4% or more with  one  set of instruments.  This may reflect the 
increased  importance  of human  capital after 1980. Further investigation, 
however,  suggests  that the  larger estimates  in samples  with  1990 data 
are likely  due  to changes  in the  schooling  variable in the  1990 Census. 
On balance,  the analysis  here offers little evidence  for sizable external 
returns  to  education,  at  least  over  the  range  of  variation  induced  by 
changing  CSLs. Moreover,  while  some of the estimates  are positive,  they 
are nowhere  near large enough  to rationalize  the cross-country  associa- 
tion  between  average  education  and  average  income  documented  in 
Figure 1 or even  the cross-state (OLS) association  documented  in Table 2. 
Some  final caveats  are in order. First, the  standard  errors associated 
with the estimates  reported here lead to confidence  intervals that include 
external  returns  of,  say,  1-3%.  External returns  of  this  magnitude  are 
sufficient  to justify  significant  public  subsidies  for education.  Second, 
our  strategy  identifies  local  effects,  missing  external  returns  that raise 
wages  nationwide.  Finally, our estimates  are driven by changes  in secon- 
dary schooling  and not  changes  in higher  education.  Weak external  re- How  Large  Are  Human-Capital  Externalities?  *  49 
turns  to  secondary  school  do  not  rule  out  the  possibility  of  external 
returns to schooling  at higher levels. 
Appendix  A.  Mathematical  Details 
A.1 DERIVATION  OF EQUATION  (14) 
Rewrite equation  (13) as follows: 
Y,  =  g*  +  IToT,  +  (ITT  +  TT)Sj  +  ,; 
where  i,  si -  Sj. Since  Ti  and  Sj are uncorrelated  by construction,  we 
have 
Pi  =  7TO  +  r1, 
C(i,  Yii) 
v(Ti) 
Simplifying  the second  line, 
C((s,-  S),  Y,i) 
V0  (s,) 
- 
V(Si) 
O=  / 
V(s,)- V(sj) 
C(s,  Yi)  V(si)  _  C(S,  Y()i  /  V(S,)  8 
\  (s,)  aV(s,)  -  V(Sj)/  \ v(s)  AV(s,)  -  V(Sj) 
=  poo + pi(l -  q) = pi + q(po  -  pi), 
where  m  V(si)/[V(si) -  V(Sj)]. Solving  for rl,  we have 
71 =  i -  T0  =  P(P  -  Po). 
A.2 HOW TO INSTRUMENT  FOR  INDIVIDUAL  SCHOOLING? 
To discuss  this issue  more formally, consider  a simplified  version  of the 
random-coefficient  model  (12),  again  with  no  covariates  and  no  time 
dimension.  Assume  also  that a single  binary  instrument  is available to 
estimate  yi, say zi, a dummy  for having  been born in a state with restric- 
tive CSLs. Finally, suppose  we  adjust for the effects  of si by subtracting 
y2s,, where  y* is some  average  of  y2i. In other words,  subtract y*si from 
both sides  of (12) to obtain 50 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
Yij-  2*Si -'ij  _ 
+  ylSj  +  [Uj +  Ei +  (2i  -  2*)Si].  (15) 
What value  of  y'  allows  us  to use  zi as an instrument  for Sj in  (15) to 
obtain  a consistent  estimate  of y1? The instrumental  variables  estimand 
in this case,  yl',  is given  by the Wald formula: 
E[Y  ,  I  zi =  1] -  E[Y,i  | zi = 0]  -1  = 
E[Sj I zi =  1]  -  E[Sj | zi =  0] 
(  E[2ii  I  zi =  1] -  E[y2isi  I  zi = 0] 
E[si zi = 1] -  E[si I  zi  ]  Y2  71  \z  i E[,l  ] -E[s,  z i  E[s  zi =  1] -  E[s  I z, = 0] 
E[Sj  | z=  1] -  E[S  z  = 01 / 
This shows  that yfV  estimates  external returns to education  consistently 
(i.e.,  equals  y1) if  the  adjustment  for  individual  schooling  uses  the 
coefficient 
E[y2si  I zi  =  1]  -  E[y2isi  I zi  =  0] 
72 = 
E[si  zi =  1] -  E[si [ zi = 0] 
E[Yij  -  y1Si zi=  1] -  E[Y, -  ylSI | zi = 0] 
(16) 
E[s I  zi =  1] -  E[si I  zi = 01 
In other words,  the adjustment  for effects  of si should  use  the  (popula- 
tion) IV estimate  of private returns generated  by zi, once we  subtract the 
effect of human-capital  exteralities. 
Of  course,  we  cannot  use  zi to  estimate  both  private  and  external 
returns, even  though  (16) appears to require this. But instruments  based 
on  quarter of birth  can be  used  to  estimate  y,.  Let qi denote  a single 
instrument  derived  from quarter of birth, say a dummy  for first-quarter 
births. Since qi  is orthogonal  to Sj, we have 
E[Yij qi =  1] -  E[Yij qi = 0]  E[y2isi  I  qi =  1] -  E[y2i  I  qi = 0 
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If Y*  = y2, the quarter-of-birth instrument provides  an appropriate adjust- 
ment for private returns in (15).22 
To see why  -y should  be close to y,,  let wi(si)  2isi,  and note that w'(si) 
is  the  causal  effect  of  schooling  on  i's  (log)  wages  with  Sj fixed  [see 
equation  (12)]. Also,  let sli denote  the schooling  i would  get if zi = 1, and 
let soi  denote  the schooling  i would  get if zi =  0.23  Angrist,  Graddy, and 
Imbens  (1995) show  that 
=  f  E[w,(o') I  sli  a >  soi]P[sli  a >  So]i  do  (17) 
fP[si  a >  soi] do-7) 
which  is an average derivative  with weighting  function P[s  - oa  > si]  = 
P[si <--  o- zi = 0] -  P[si -< o- zi = 1]. In other words,  IV estimation  using zi 
produces  an average  of the derivative  wi(o),  with  weight  given  to each 
value  o-  in proportion  to the instrument-induced  change  in the cumula- 
tive distribution  function  (CDF) of schooling  at that point.  Similarly,  ;y  is 
a CDF-weighted  average  with  sli and  soi defined  to  correspond  to  the 
values  of qi. 
CSL  instruments  and  quarter-of-birth  instruments  both  estimate 
individual  returns for people  whose  schooling  is affected by compulsory 
schooling  laws-i.e.,  individuals  who  would  have  otherwise  dropped 
out of school.  So the weighting  functions  P[s, -  oa-  zi = 0] -  P[si -  ao zi = 
1] and P[si -  - 
I  qi = 0] -  P[si '  a I  qi = 1] should  be similar. In fact, Figure 
2 shows  that, like quarter-of-birth instruments,  CSLs changed  the distri- 
bution  of schooling  primarily in the  8-12  range.  This suggests  that  y 
and y* capture similar features of the causal relationship between  individ- 
ual schooling  and earnings. 
Appendix  B. Data  Sources  and  Methods 
B.1  MICRO DATA 
The paper  uses  data from the  1950,  1960,  1970,  1980, and  1990 PUMS 
files.  Census  data  were  taken  from  the  IPUMS  system  (Ruggles  and 
Sobek,  1997). The files used  are as follows: 
22. In practice,  we have more than one CSL  instrument,  so it may be possible to use CSLs 
to instrument si and St simultaneously. Note, however, that because of the group 
structure  of Sit and the CSL  instruments,  the projection  of si on the CSL  instruments  is 
almost identical to the projection  of Sit  on the CSL  instruments.  This is not a problem 
with quarter-of-birth  instruments,  since they are independent of Sit. 
23. These potential schooling choices can be described in terms of the theoretical  frame- 
work. Suppose, for example, that q(si)  = rj  and the CSL  instrument  changes discount 
rates  from /oi  or  li as in Card  (1995).  Using (8), individual  schooling choices would be 
Soi  =  v0Oi-/1oi  and sli =  v,i-/li. 52 *  ACEMOGLU  & ANGRIST 
1950 General (1/330 sample) 
1960 General (1% sample) 
1970 Form 1 State (1% sample) 
1970 Form 2 State (1% sample) 
1980 5% State (A Sample) 
1990  1% unweighted  (a  1% random  self-weighted  sample  created  by 
IPUMS) 
Our  initial  extract included  all U.S.-born  white  men  aged  21-58.  The 
1950 sample  is limited  to sample-line individuals  (i.e.,  those  with  long- 
form responses).  Our sample  excludes  men  born or living  in Alaska or 
Hawaii.  Estimates  were  weighted  by  the  IPUMS  weighting  variable 
SLWT, adjusted in the case of 1970 to reflect the fact that we use two files 
for  that  year  (i.e.,  divided  by  2).  The  weights  are  virtually  constant 
within  years, but vary slightly  to reflect minor adjustments  by IPUMS to 
improve  estimation  of population  totals. 
The schooling  variable was  calculated  as follows:  For 1950-1980,  the 
variable  is  HIGRADED  (General),  the  IPUMS recode  of  highest  grade 
enrolled and grade completed  into highest  grade completed.  For the 1990 
Census,  which has only categorical schooling,  we assigned  group means 
for white  men  from Park (1994, Table 5),  who  uses  a one-time  overlap 
questionnaire  from the February 1990 CPS to construct averages for essen- 
tially the  same  Census  categories.  This  generates  a years  of  schooling 
variable roughly  comparable across censuses  (GRADCOMP). Finally, we 
censored  GRADCOMP at 17, since this is the highest  grade completed  in 
the 1950 census.  We call this variable GRADCAP. 
The  dependent  variable  is  log  weekly  wage,  calculated  by  dividing 
annual  wages  by weeks  worked,  where  wages  refer to wage  and salary 
income  only.  Wage topcodes  vary across  censuses.  We imposed  a uni- 
form topcode  as follows.  Wage data for every  year for the full extract of 
white  men aged 21-58  were censored  at the 98th percentile  for that year. 
The censoring  value  is the 98th percentile  times  1.5. Weeks worked  are 
grouped  in  the  1960 and  1970 Censuses.  We assigned  means  to  1960 
categorical values  using  1950 averages,  and we  assigned  means  to 1970 
categorical values  using  1980 averages. 
The analyses  in the paper, including  first-stage  relationships,  are lim- 
ited to men with  positive  weekly  wages.  Analyses  using  1960-1980  data 
are limited  to men born 1910-1919  in the 1960 Census,  1920-1929  in the 
1970  Census,  and  1930-1939  in  the  1980 Census.  Since  year-of-birth 
variables are not available in the 1950 and 1990 Censuses,  analyses  using 
those  data sets are limited  to men aged 40-49. How  Large  Are  Human-Capital  Externalities?  *  53 
B.2 CALCULATION  OF AVERAGE  SCHOOLING 
Average  schooling  is the  mean  of GRADCAP by state and census  year 
for all U.S.-born  persons  aged 16-64.  For 1970, we used  only the Form 2 
State sample  (a 1% file), and for 1980 we  used  a 1% random subsample, 
drawn  from the 5% State (A Sample)  using  the IPUMS SUBSAMP vari- 
able. The SLWT weighting  variable was  adjusted  to reflect the fact that 
this leaves  a 1% sample  for each year. The averages  use  data excluding 
Alaska  and  Hawaii  (residence  or  birthplace).  Average  schooling  was 
calculated  for individuals  with  positive  weeks  worked  and weighted  by 
the  product  of  SLWT and  weeks  worked.  Categorical  weeks  worked 
variables were imputed  as described  above. 
B.3 MATCH  TO CSLs  AND STATE  AVERAGE  SCHOOLING 
The CSLs in force in each year from 1914 to 1972 were  measured  using 
the five variables  described  in Section 4 of this appendix.  For each indi- 
vidual  in the microdata extract, we  calculated  the approximate  year the 
person  was  age  14 using  age on census  day (not year of birth, which  is 
not  available  in  1950 and  1990).  The CSLs in force  in that year  in the 
person's  state of birth were  then  assigned  to that person.  State average 
schooling  was matched  to individual  state of residence  and census  year. 
B.4 CSL  VARIABLES 
Data  on  CSLs  were  collected  and  organized  by  Ms.  Xuanhui  Ng,  in 
consultation  with  us. 
B.4.1  Sources  The sources  are collected  in Table 12, in which 
enroll_age  is the maximum  age by which  a child has  to enroll at school, 
drop_age  is  the  minimum  age  a child  is  allowed  to drop  out  of school, 
req_sch  is  the  minimum  years  of schooling  a child  has  to obtain before 
dropping  out, 
work_age  is  the  minimum  age  at which  a child  can  get  a work  permit, 
work_sch  is the minimum  years of schooling  a child needs  for obtaining  a 
work permit. 
Source abbreviations  are given  with  the references  (Section B.5). 
B.4.2  Methods  Data were  drawn from the sources  listed  in Table 12. In 
some  cases  sources  were  ambiguous  or there  were  conflicts  between 
sources  for the same year. For resolution,  we  looked  for patterns  across 
years  that seemed  to make  sense,  and tried to minimize  the number  of Table  12  SOURCES  OF CSL  DATA 
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source  changes.  In  the  table,  M  denotes  missing,  i.e.,  we  found  no 
source or reliable information  for that variable in that year. Missing  data 
were  imputed  by  bringing  older  data  forward.  Intersource  years  were 
imputed  and  the  data set  expanded  by bringing  older  data forward  to 
make  a complete  set  of five  CSL laws  for each  year from 1914 to 1965. 
The imputed  data set contains either numerical entries or NR, indicat- 
ing we  found  laws  that appeared  to impose  no restriction  (e.g.,  6 years 
schooling  required  for  a work  permit,  so  work_sch  =  6,  but  a work 
permit  available  at  any  age,  so  work_age  =  NR).  The  algorithm  for 
calculating  required  years  of  schooling  for  dropout  and  the  required 
years of schooling  for a work permit handles  NR codes  as follows: 
If reqsch  =  NR,  then  req-sch  =  0; 
If enroll-age  =  NR  or drop_age  =  NR,  then  CA  =  max(0,  req-sch); 
If  enroll_age  +  NR  and  drop_age  #  NR  then  CA  =  max(drop-age- 
enroll-age,  reqsch). 
If work_age  =  NR,  then  work_age  =  0; 
If work-sch  =  NR,  then  work-sch  =  0; 
If enroll_age  =  NR  then  CL  =  max(0,  work_sch); 
If enroll-age  #  NR then CL = max(work_age-enroll_age,  worksch). 
We coded  a general literacy requirement  without  a grade or age require- 
ments  as NR. We coded  a grade requirement  of "elementary  school"  as 
6, even  though  this was  distinct  from sixth grade in some  sources  (our 
dummies  would  group these  requirements  anyway). 
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MARK  BILS 
University  of Rochester 
1. Introduction 
Daron Acemoglu  and Joshua Angrist  attack the  important  and difficult 
problem  of  measuring  external  returns  from  an  individual's  schooling 
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made for schooling.  Education externalities also play a prominent  role in 
the  literatures  on  city  formation  and  neighborhood  effects,  and,  more 
generally,  in discussions  of income  inequality.  With the exception  of lei- 
sure,  education  is  no  doubt  the  good  most  heavily  subsidized  by  the 
government.  Heckman  and  Klenow  (1997) calculate  that about  30% of 
the costs of an individual's  schooling,  at the margin, is absorbed by other 
persons'  budgets  through  government  subsidies.  These  policies  are of- 
ten rationalized  on the basis of important external effects from increased 
schooling  and school  spending. 
More  exactly,  Acemoglu  and  Angrist  use  an  instrumental  variables 
(IV) approach to examine  the relationship 
In wi =  yS  +  y2si,  (1) 
where  wi and  si refer  to  the  wage  and  schooling  for person  i,  and  S 
denotes  average  schooling  for a broader  group,  whose  schooling  may 
have  an external  impact  on  person  i.1 For Acemoglu  and  Angrist,  this 
group is persons  living  in the same U.S.  state as person  i. 
I first discuss  Acemoglu  and Angrist's  model  interpretation  of the pa- 
rameter Yi  in equation  (1) as capturing exteralities  from human  capital. I 
then discuss  why  an OLS estimate  of y, in equation  (1) is problematic and 
briefly  discuss  the  authors'  IV approach.  I then  attempt  to  gauge  the 
potential  magnitude  of y, on the basis of growth  accounting. 
2. Interpreting  the  External  Return  to Schooling 
Acemoglu  and Angrist  discuss  two distinct rationales for a positive  y, in 
equation  (1), that is,  a positive  effect  of other persons'  schooling  on an 
individual's  earnings.  The first follows  literature on cities  (e.g.,  Rauch, 
1993), growth  (e.g.,  Lucas, 1988), and neighborhood  effects (e.g.,  Borjas, 
1995) by assuming  that the human  capital of others acts as a complemen- 
tary input to your own  labor through  the exchange  of ideas,  making you 
more productive  and increasing your wage.  More novel,  the authors con- 
sider a model of search that also leads to a causal increase in your earnings 
from operating  in an economy  with  greater average human  capital. 
In the  empirical work,  the  authors  make  equation  (1) operational  by 
measuring  the broader group's human  capital by schooling  of other per- 
sons  in  the  state  of  residence.  Particularly for models  based  on  exter- 
nalities in production,  it is not clear if the state of residence  is the relevant 
economy.  Ideas  can probably  be exchanged  across  state lines  nearly  as 
1. This is a simplified  depiction  of Acemoglu  and Angrist's  more explicit equation  (9). Comment  *  61 
easily  as within.  Suppose  that the externality  from human  capital oper- 
ates  by  increasing  the  adoption  of  technology  because  it  effectively 
spreads the fixed costs of invention  and innovation  across a greater num- 
ber of skilled workers who  will make use of the technology.  Provided  the 
innovation  can diffuse  across states,  the externality  from human  capital 
will not project on the level  of schooling  in a person's  state of residence. 
This criticism is particularly relevant given  that Acemoglu  and Angrist's 
IV estimates  do not suggest  externalities  at the state level. 
Their model  of search externalities  from human  capital can be briefly 
described  as follows.  A pool  of workers and a pool  of firms look to form 
matches.  A worker  brings  his  human  capital h and  a firm its physical 
capital k to a prospective  match. If a match occurs, output  equal to k"hV  is 
produced.  The  key  is  that,  regardless  of  how  much  capital  the  firm 
provides  or how  much human  capital the worker possesses,  this output 
is split with a fraction j3  going to the worker and a fraction 1 -  3 going to 
the firm. This environment  yields  three implications: 
1.  There is underinvestment  in both physical  and human  capital. 
2.  Because  human  and  physical  capital  are complementary  in produc- 
tion,  firms invest  in greater physical  capital if they anticipate  match- 
ing with  a pool  of workers with  greater human  capital. 
3.  Directly related to the second  result,  a worker's wage  is increasing  in 
the  human  capital of other workers  in their search pool,  as well  as 
their  own.  This  last  result  clearly  rationalizes  relating  a  worker's 
wage  to other workers'  schooling,  as in equation  (1). 
The critical assumption  in this story of search externalities  is that the 
pie  is split  independently  of how  much  each  side  brings  to the match. 
This will  not  be  the  case,  for instance,  if there  is directed  search as in 
Acemoglu  and  Shimer  (1999). More  precisely,  if a worker  by  building 
human  capital and a resume  can gain access  to job opportunities,  then, 
given  that firms can choose  what  set  of workers  to consider,  a worker 
should  be able to achieve  higher  earnings  commensurate  with  the mar- 
ginal  product  of  the  acquired  human  capital.  This  seems  like  a good 
description  of the labor market, as least in developed  economies.  Poten- 
tial employers  ask for resumes,  conduct  interviews,  call references,  etc. 
Furthermore,  job listings  often  quote  a salary range,  with  starting pay 
depending  on the education,  experience,  and other relevant  characteris- 
tics of the applicant. 
Acemoglu  and  Angrist's  description  of match  externalities  brings  to 
mind another arena in which  matching  is important. Consider marriages 
that form between  two persons.  For convenience,  I will refer to the two 62 *  BILS 
persons as husband and wife. Suppose that the husband and wife share 
their household income independently of how much the husband pro- 
duces and how  much the wife produces-for  simplicity, say equally. 
Then consumption  for both  husband  and wife  equal  (Whusb  +  Wwife)/2  = 
f(Shusb)  +  (Swife)]/2,  where  si is the schooling  of member  i, and f(s,)  is the 
earnings for a member with that schooling. Suppose schooling is deter- 
mined prior to forming marriages. If matches form independently of a 
person's earnings potential and if students, in choosing when to leave 
school, do not show altruism to their future (unknown) spouse,  then 
this  model  generates an  important externality to  schooling.  As  in 
Acemoglu and Angrist's setting, persons underinvest in schooling be- 
cause they only internalize  half of the gain in future earnings. In contrast 
to their setting, this externality does not show up in a wage equation 
such as equation (1). 
But at least one of the assumptions above, that marriages  form inde- 
pendently of a person's schooling, appears at odds with the evidence. 
Based on 22,102 households that were respondents in the 1980 to 1994 
Consumer Expenditure  Surveys, I projected  years of schooling for wives 
on the schooling of their husbands, and vice versa. The results, with 
standard  errors  in parentheses, are 
Swife  =  058Shusb,  Shusb  =  0.70Swife. 
(0.005)  (0.006) 
So conditional on the husband having one more year of schooling, we 
should expect the household to have 1.58 more years; and conditional 
on the wife having one more year of schooling, we should expect the 
household to have 1.70 more years. Matching in marriage looks very 
directed. Thus individuals are able to obtain  a total return  on their  school- 
ing that is much of the total household gain. This should provide per- 
sons with incentive to obtain schooling, even if they are not concerned 
with providing for their future spouse. So even here, match externalities 
to schooling may not be very important. 
3.  The OLS Relationship 
Estimating equation (1) by OLS, Acemoglu and Angrist find that one 
more year of schooling for a worker is associated with  7.3% higher 
earnings, with a standard error of less  than 0.1%. (Here I focus on 
results for the sample period of 1960-1980.) But, more striking,  one year 
of schooling of others in the worker's state, holding the worker's  school- 
ing constant, is also associated with 7.3%  higher earnings, with a stan- Comment  *  63 
dard  error  of  1.6%.  This  estimate  is  comparable  to,  though  slightly 
smaller than,  estimates  in Moretti (1999). 
The  authors  are concerned  that  OLS estimates  may  provide  an  up- 
ward  bias  of  the  external  effects  of  others  schooling  on  a  worker's 
earnings.  I would  like to expand  on their discussion  of this problem  in 
Section  2.4  of their paper.  They  describe  an economy  with  free migra- 
tion.  The  externality  from  schooling  drives  up  the  price  of  the  scarce 
resource,  land,  in areas with  more  schooling.  The resulting  higher  cost 
of living  in areas with  more average  schooling  means  that, even  though 
there  is  an  important  productivity  gain  from  living  there,  the  market 
clears with no gains for additional  workers to migrate to areas with more 
schooling.  This is a standard  view  on the role of land pricing in allocat- 
ing persons  across locations  in the presence  of a productive  or consump- 
tive public good  at a location  (e.g.,  Roback, 1982). 
For the  present  issue  of measuring  externalities  from schooling,  the 
concern is that any factor that results in higher productivity  in location X 
will not only  result in higher  wages  and higher  costs  of living  at X, but 
will  also  attract workers  with  more  schooling  and  greater unmeasured 
ability. The market equilibrium will tend to concentrate human capital on 
the  most  valuable  land.  As  a result,  the  OLS relation  showing  higher 
earnings  for  those  living  in  areas  where  others  have  more  schooling 
need  not reflect any structural external benefit  of schooling.  Instead,  the 
results may show  only that areas that are productive,  with higher wages 
and higher  living costs,  attract workers with more schooling  and greater 
unmeasured  skills. 
The  notion  that  areas  with  higher  levels  of  schooling  also  display 
higher  housing  prices  is supported  in the data. For 45 states  I was  able 
to relate the  1995 CPI for housing  for the  state's  most  populous  city to 
average  schooling  level  in  the  state.  The  housing  cost  is  from  the 
ACCRA Cost of Living Index; the state schooling  levels were provided  to 
me by Joshua Angrist.  S denotes  average schooling  for all male workers 
in the state; S4050  denotes  average  schooling  for men  aged 40 to 50. The 
relationship  as estimated  by OLS, with standard errors in parentheses,  is 
ln(housing  CPI) =  0.10 S  or, alternatively, 
(0.003) 
=  0.15 S40-50- 
(0.003) 
Housing  makes up about a third of the cost of living. So, allowing  for the 
higher  price  of housing  alone  eats  up  about  half  of the  wage  gain,  as 
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There is also evidence  that persons  who  live in states with  more aver- 
age schooling  display  above-average  human  capital,  even  if they  them- 
selves  do not have above-average  schooling.  That is, more schooling  in a 
state is correlated with higher unmeasured  abilities. In 1979 the National 
Longitudinal  Survey  of Youth (NLSY) gave  its respondents  the  Armed 
Forces  Quantitative  Test (AFQT). The AFQT scores  are understood  to 
reflect acquired  knowledge  as well  as innate  intelligence.  For 5629 re- 
spondents  I can project  their AFQT on  their own  schooling  as well  as 
average  schooling  in their state or residence.  The result is 
AFQTi  =  5.82  si +  4.34  S. 
(0.18)  (0.44) 
So a person's  test score projects nearly as much on the average schooling 
in one's  state as on their own  schooling. 
This suggests  that an OLS estimate of the key parameter yi in equation 
(1) will be biased  upward,  as the projection of wages  on S may reflect the 
higher  unmeasured  ability, as reflected  in the  AFQT score,  rather than 
an  externality.  For workers  in  the  NLSY data  set,  4.34  extra points  of 
AFQT score is associated  with 2.0% higher earnings  (with standard error 
of 0.2%), controlling  for individual  schooling.  This would  explain  about 
one-third  of the OLS estimate  of y1. 
Another  interpretation  is that growing  up in a state with  more  aver- 
age schooling  is what  actually causes  AFQT to be higher  in those  states 
after controlling  for an individual's  level  of schooling.  Thus  this  again 
would  point  to an important  externality  from schooling,  though  occur- 
ring  through  learning  as  opposed  to  production  or  search  as  in 
Acemoglu  and Angrist's  interpretation. 
4.  Discussion  of Acemoglu  and  Angrist's  IV Results 
Given  concerns  that  an  OLS  estimate  of  the  schooling  externality  is 
upward  biased,  Acemoglu  and Angrist pursue  an IV estimator based  on 
state regulations  that restrict young  persons'  ability to drop out of school 
or work before a certain age. They document  that more stringent restric- 
tions  in  a state  are  clearly  associated  with  more  years  of  high-school 
attendance.  Looking  at their Table 7, columns  (4) and  (8), upon  instru- 
menting  for schooling,  they continue  to find a private return to a year of 
schooling  of about 7%. But now  they  find an external effect  from state- 
wide  schooling  roughly  equal to zero, with a standard error of about 3%. 
I see their work as very valuable.  As discussed  above and in their intro- 
duction,  an assumption  of positive  human-capital  externalities  plays  an Comment  *  65 
important  role in economic  theorizing  as well  as in public  policies.  Yet, 
empirically  the  question  is very  open.  The presumptive  positive  exter- 
nalities  are supported  by  a small body  of empirical work  (e.g.,  Rauch, 
1993; Moretti, 1999) in which  causality is difficult to decipher. Secondly, I 
see their IV estimator as a natural attack on the problem. I believe it should 
move one's prior quite clearly toward a fairly small or no external effect of 
schooling,  unless,  as in my case, that result is already close to your prior. 
At  the  same  time,  I would  note  a  few  limitations.  First of  all,  the 
standard error associated  with  their IV point  estimate  is sizable at about 
3%. Thus a 95% confidence  interval would  include  an external return to 
schooling  of 6%, which  is smaller, but of the  same  order of magnitude 
as,  the  OLS estimate.  A  90% confidence  interval  includes  an  external 
return to schooling  of 3%. 
Secondly,  their experiment  in raising  years  of schooling  is very  spe- 
cific.  The  increased  years  in  schooling  generated  by  their instruments 
are associated  with  keeping  boys  in high  school  who  would  prefer  to 
leave.  It may be that external benefits  from such enforced  schooling  are 
smaller  than  could  be  garnered  by  encouraging  college  attendance 
through  tuition subsidies.  On the other hand,  the relevant sample in this 
paper are boys who  were in high school in approximately  the years 1930 
to  1950. Choosing  to  drop  out  of  high  school  during  that period  was 
much  more common  than it is today. 
Finally, there  may  be  important  externalities  from  schooling  not  re- 
flected  in higher wage  rates for others.  My example  above  of the return 
to schooling  benefiting  a future spouse  is a possible  example.  It is often 
argued  that increased  education  makes  citizens  better voters,  though  I 
could never  follow  the reasoning.  A cursory reading  of Dickens's  Oliver 
Twist suggests  the external benefits  in lower  crime from keeping  young 
men  in a monitored  setting  such as a school  or a prison.  Related to this, 
Lochner  (1999) calculates  that  the  social  benefits  from  reduced  crime 
associated  with men graduating  from high school are at least $7000 (1996 
dollars),  and perhaps  considerably  more. 
5.  Limiting  the  Magnitude  of Schooling  Externality  by 
Means  of Growth  Accounting 
Given  the  difficulty  in constructing  arguably  valid  instruments  to esti- 
mate the return to schooling,  and especially  the external return to school- 
ing, it is worthwhile  attacking the problem from other directions  as well. 
I consider  one  direction based  on examining  the growth-accounting  im- 
plications  of schooling  externalities.  I will argue that externalities  of the 
size  estimated  by  OLS  in  the  authors'  Table 2  are implausibly  large. 66 *  BILS 
Given  the rapid rise in schooling  levels  in the United  States and world- 
wide,  externalities  of that magnitude  would  constitute  an unreasonable 
fraction of measured  growth  in total factor productivity  (TFP) in recent 
decades. 
Annualized  growth rates for TFP for the United States for 1950 to 1997, 
and for subperiods,  are given  in the first row of the following  table: 
1950-1997  1950-1970  1970-1997 
gTFP  1.13%  1.78%  0.65% 
Schooling  8.9---13.4  8.9---10.7  10.7-*13.4 
Adj.  TFP  0.66%  1.34%  0.16% 
(7Y  = 0.073) 
The TFP numbers come from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (They 
are  available  at  Web  site  stats.bls.gov/mprhome.htm.)  These  growth 
rates in TFP already account for the increased schooling  in the workforce 
and  changes  in  workforce  composition  in  terms  of  experience  and 
gender,  as discussed  by Jorgenson  (1995). The adjustment  for increased 
schooling  reflects  a private  return  to  schooling,  as  estimated  in  wage 
regressions  of the Mincer (1974) type.  But it does not consider an external 
return to schooling  above  the Mincerian return. TFP growth  averages  a 
little more  than  1.1% per year for 1950 to 1997. As is well  known,  TFP 
growth has been much slower  in the latter portion of the postwar period, 
averaging  0.65% per year for 1970 to 1997. 
In the second  row of the above  table I report the growth  rate in aver- 
age years of schooling  in the working-age  population.  (I calculate this for 
earlier years  from historical  statistics  derived  from the Current Popula- 
tion Surveys.  1997 values  are available at the BLS Web site cited above.) 
Schooling  attainment  has  grown  rapidly, by about a year of attainment 
per decade.  This growth  has not subsided. 
In the third and final row of the table, I adjust the Commerce  Depart- 
ment's  measure  of TFP growth  for an external return to schooling  equal 
to 7.3% higher  labor input  for each  additional  year of schooling  in the 
national  workforce.  The externality  of 7.3% reflects the OLS estimate  of 
'y from the authors' Table 2. I use  a labor share of two-thirds  to convert 
the effect of the externality  on effective  labor input  to an effect on GDP. 
For 1950 to 1997 this reduces  residual  TFP growth  from 1.13% to 0.66% 
per year. More striking is the period  from 1970 to 1997. Adjusting  TFP 
for the externality from schooling  reduces it nearly to zero, viz.,  to 0.16% 
per year. Another way to state this is that more than three-fourths  of TFP 
growth  for 1970 to  1997 is attributable to the external benefits  of rising Comment 67 
schooling.  This strikes me as implausible.  It leaves  almost no room for a 
contribution  of new  approaches,  new  technologies,  and  new  types  of 
equipment  to productivity  growth  over the past 30 years.2 
Similar,  and  in  fact  stronger,  statements  apply  if  we  look  across  a 
broader set of countries.  Using  the Mincerian approach to relate human 
capital  to  years  of  schooling  and  experience,  as  discussed  in  Bils and 
Klenow  (2000), I calculated  average  annual TFP growth  for 89 countries 
for  the  years  1960 to  1990.  All  specifications  require  that  the  private 
returns  to  schooling  and  experience  be  consistent  with  empirical  esti- 
mates  of Mincer equations  across more than 50 countries.  The specifica- 
tions differ in whether  the Mincerian return decreases  in years of school- 
ing.  Depending  on  this  choice,  the  growth  rate of  TFP, across  the  89 
countries,  averages  from  0.10% to  0.40% per  year.  Over  the  same  30 
years,  schooling  attainment  (based on Barro and Lee,  1996) grew by an 
average of 2.1 years,  or 0.07 schooling  years per year. Externalities from 
schooling  consistent  with  the  OLS estimate,  y,  =  0.073,  by themselves 
would  yield  a rate of growth  in TFP of 0.34% per year.  This falls very 
high in the range of total TFP growth of 0.10% to 0.40% per year, leaving 
no  room  for improvements  in ideas  and  adoption  of technologies  as a 
source of worldwide  growth  from 1960 to 1990. 
The upshot,  I would  argue,  is that growth  accounting  suggests  exter- 
nalities  from  schooling  that  are  no  more  than  a  fraction  of  the  OLS 
estimate  of y,. On the other hand,  this type of exercise is certainly unable 
to rule out some  smaller external effect of schooling. 
I believe  readers should  take away  from Acemoglu  and Angrist's  pa- 
per  that external  benefits  as large  as private  returns  are very  unlikely. 
Furthermore,  external  benefits  greater  than  about  40% of  the  private 
benefit  (an  external  return  of  3% on  earnings  for  each  extra  year  of 
aggregate  schooling)  are fairly  unlikely.  I would  draw  similar  conclu- 
sions  from these  growth  accounting  exercises. 
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Comment 
CECILIA  ELENA  ROUSE 
Princeton  University 
One  of the  few  areas on  which  many  economists  agree  is that market 
failures  justify  government  intervention,  particularly when  it comes  to 
education.  For  example,  in  Capitalism and Freedom, Milton  Friedman 
(1982  ed.,  pp.  85-86;  original  1962)  writes,  ".  .  . government  interven- 
tion into education  can be rationalized  on  ...  the existence  of substan- 
tial 'neighborhood  effects,'  i.e.,  circumstances  under which  the action of 
one individual  imposes  significant  costs on other individuals  for which it 
is not feasible  to make him compensate  them,  or yields  significant  gains 
to other individuals  for which  it is not feasible to make them compensate 
him-circumstances  that make  voluntary  exchange  impossible."  Based 
on the belief,  the subsidization  (and provision  in the case of K-12  educa- 
tion) of education  is a major focus of government  at all levels.  Indeed,  in 
1997 direct  expenditures  on  education  by  state  and  local governments 
accounted  for over 7% of GDP. 
And  yet,  because  these  neighborhood  effects,  or externalities,  can be 
difficult  to  measure,  we  have  precious  little  direct  evidence  that  the 
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social  return to education  does,  indeed,  differ from the private  return. 
Previous  authors have  attempted  to measure  the social return to educa- 
tion by studying  the effect of education  on other outcomes  such as crime 
and  welfare  dependence,  but  these  studies  are  few  and  far between 
because  of the difficulty of obtaining credible information on both educa- 
tion  and  the  outcome  of  interest  (which  can vary  considerably  over  a 
lifetime).  In addition,  it is difficult  to design  an analytic  approach  that 
credibly generates  a consistent  estimate  of the causal effect of education 
on the outcome. 
Another  approach  is to interpret the coefficient  on an aggregate  mea- 
sure of schooling  in a regression of individual wages  on individual  school- 
ing and aggregate  schooling  as an estimate  of the externalities  to school- 
ing. The interpretation is that, conditional  on one's own schooling,  if one 
earns more as the educational  level  of one's  "neighbors"  increases,  it is 
because  the others' education  is generating  positive  externalities  for the 
individual  in question.  This is the  approach  followed  in this ambitious 
paper by Acemoglu  and Angrist.  Other papers using  this approach have 
found  large and statistically  significant  effects of aggregate  schooling  on 
one's  own  schooling,  suggesting  positive  externalities  to education. 
However,  this paper goes  further than most of the previous  literature. 
The  authors  attempt  to  address  head-on  the  concern  that  aggregate 
schooling  may  be  spuriously  positively  correlated  with  wages  because 
economic  growth  may  increase  both  wages  and  the  supply  of,  or de- 
mand for, schooling,  or because  positive  area-specific shocks may attract 
more  "able" individuals  to the  geographic  area under  consideration  (a 
U.S.  state,  in  this  paper).  Therefore,  they  instrument  for  aggregate 
schooling,  using  (1) compulsory  schooling  laws  in effect in the  state in 
which  the individual  grew up during the time the individual  was young 
and  (2) compulsory  schooling  laws  in  effect  in  the  state  in which  the 
individual  currently resides  during  the time  the individual  was  young. 
Identification  comes  from changes  within  states  in compulsory  school- 
ing  laws,  the  identifying  assumption  being  that  the  legal  changes  are 
independent  of  (the  residual  of)  the  wages  of  the  individual  30 years 
later. 
As with  most  of Angrist's  other work,  this is a clever empirical strat- 
egy.  A  key  question  for identification  is why  and  when  states  change 
their compulsory  schooling  laws.  For example,  are they  changed  in re- 
sponse  to economic  conditions?  If so,  do changes  occur during times of 
economic  prosperity  or during  economic  downturns?  I can imagine  it 
going  either way. On the one hand,  during times of economic  prosperity 
residents  may  be  wealthier  and,  through  an  income  effect,  willing  to 
increase  the  compulsory  schooling  age.  On  the  other  hand,  perhaps 70 - ROUSE 
residents  are willing  to  increase  the  compulsory  schooling  age  during 
times  of economic  downturns  when  the  opportunity  cost  of attending 
school  is  lower.  And  yet  it will  matter  to  the  interpretation  of the  au- 
thors'  results  which  "story" is more  plausible.  If one  believes  that the 
laws  are changed  during  economic  upswings  (which  may  lead to other 
changes  that  affect  future  wages,  such  as  an  improvement  in  school 
quality),  then  the authors'  estimates,  as small as they  are, may actually 
overstate  schooling  externalities.  Conversely,  if  the  laws  are  changed 
during  downturns  (and  there  are other  changes  that occur during  that 
time  that affect future  wages),  then  the authors'  estimates  may  under- 
state  education  externalities.  Either  way,  it would  be  useful  to  know 
more about the political economy  of the decision  to change  compulsory 
schooling  laws. 
I would  also like to have a better understanding  of how the instruments 
work.  The figures  that the authors provide  are quite useful,  but I do not 
understand  why  the instruments  have a negative  (but not always  signifi- 
cant) effect on completion  of postsecondary  education  (as measured by 14 
and  16 years or more of schooling).  While most  of the estimates  are not 
statistically significant,  they are consistently  negative.  A typical (naive?) 
sorting  model  would  suggest  that  on  an  increase  in  the  schooling  of 
individuals  at the lower  end  of the distribution,  others  would  complete 
more  schooling  in  order to  differentiate  themselves.  However,  the  au- 
thors find that those not likely affected by the laws get less schooling.  One 
possible  explanation  is that when  states strengthen compulsory  schooling 
laws,  increased  expenditures  for secondary  schooling  are required. If the 
states do not increase their total expenditures  on all education  (including 
postsecondary  education),  it is possible  that funds  are shifted  from post- 
secondary  schooling  to secondary  schooling  to pay for the increased num- 
bers of students.  This hypothesis  may have implications  for future wages 
that complicate  their identification  strategy. 
So, what  do Acemoglu  and Angrist  find? When  the authors  estimate 
their  equation  by  OLS,  they  estimate  private  returns  to  schooling  of 
about 7%, a tad lower than what most researchers estimate  today, but in 
the  same  ballpark.  They  also  estimate  external  returns  to  schooling  of 
roughly  the  same  magnitude  (once  state-of-residence  effects  have  been 
included).  With IV, the private returns to schooling  do not change much, 
but the coefficient  on the external returns falls to 1-2%. 
Why might these results differ from those found by others? One expla- 
nation  is  that  the  estimates  of  the  external  return  to  schooling  in  the 
other papers are biased upward by omitted variables. Another is that the 
authors' empirical  strategy identifies  the social return to secondary  edu- 
cation.  In contrast,  previous  papers  may  identify  the  social  return  to Comment 71 
other levels  of education.  For example,  in a recent paper  Enrico Moretti 
(1999) identifies  social returns to postsecondary  education  that are posi- 
tive and statistically significant.  One can reconcile the results by conclud- 
ing  that  there  are minimal  social  returns  to  secondary  education  but 
large social returns to post-secondary  education.  A third explanation  is 
that  the  other  papers  use  a different  level  of  aggregation  in  order  to 
identify  the external return to schooling.  For example,  many of the previ- 
ous  papers  use  the  average  level  of  schooling  in  a metropolitan  area; 
Acemoglu  and Angrist use the state.  And yet, perhaps  the metropolitan 
area is conceptually  more  appropriate,  since  it is closer  to the  level  at 
which  workers can meet and exchange  ideas regularly. Similarly, it is not 
clear whether,  conceptually,  it is the schooling  of all workers  in the state 
(or metropolitan  area) that makes  a difference,  or the schooling  of indi- 
viduals  who  would  interact with  the  individual  in production,  such  as 
those  in  the  same  industry  or occupation.  Given  the  results  from the 
previous  literature and the presumption  in the field that externalities  in 
education  are present,  it is important to understand  why  Acemoglu  and 
Angrist  estimate  such small external returns. 
Finally, suppose  these  results represent  the truth. What do they imply 
for economic  theory and/or public policy? On the one hand,  they may be 
extremely  important.  For,  even  though  the  estimates  are  imprecise, 
Acemoglu  and  Angrist's  results  imply  that  the  bulk  of  the  return  to 
secondary  education  is a private  return. And  yet,  as I mentioned  at the 
beginning,  most  economists  and  policymakers  justify  public  subsidies 
to, and perhaps  even  provision  of, elementary  and secondary  education 
by potential  positive  externalities.  As some evidence  of the commitment, 
state and local direct expenditures  on K-12  education  outpace  those  on 
higher education  by almost 4:  1. Should this public commitment  to K-12 
(or at least secondary)  education  be reconsidered? 
On  the  other  hand,  the  results  may  not  be  so  important  for policy 
today. One reason is that the sample includes  only white men aged 40-49 
from 1950 to 1980. Today's policymaking  regarding high-school  dropouts 
is focused  on  low-income  youths  and  African-American  and  Hispanic 
youth.  These  coefficients  may not apply  to them.  Most importantly, the 
approach  followed  by the  authors  captures  a relatively  narrow  form of 
externality. From a policy perspective  there are many others that may be 
equally  or more important,  such  as the effects  on tax revenues,  govern- 
ment  transfers,  and  criminal  activity.  As  a reminder,  recall the  earlier 
evaluation  of the federal Job Corps program, a training program targeted 
at low-income  youths.  In this evaluation,  the increased earnings of partici- 
pants  only  accounted  for about one-half  of the total benefits  of the pro- 
gram. The other one-half  was accounted  for by reduced criminal activity 72 *  DISCUSSION 
and reduced  reliance on transfer programs. On net, as a result, there was 
a social benefit  of the program once allowing  for costs.  This illustration is 
simply  a reminder that when  we  consider  externalities  to schooling  they 
come  in many  forms. 
In all, I enjoyed  the  paper  and  commend  the  authors  for attempting 
to  tackle  an  extremely  difficult  and  yet  extremely  important  issue  in 
economics. 
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Discussion 
In responding  to  Cecilia  Rouse's  comments,  Daron  Acemoglu  said  he 
was also puzzled  by the finding that the instruments  are negatively  corre- 
lated with  postsecondary  educational  attainment  (that is,  tougher  com- 
pulsory  K-12  attendance  laws  in a state are negatively  correlated  with 
subsequent  college  attendance).  He  agreed  that investigating  political- 
economy  explanations  for  this  correlation  would  be  interesting,  but 
was  skeptical  that these  could  imply  significant  biases  in the estimates. 
Acemoglu  also  acknowledged  the  potential  importance  of  directed 
search,  as pointed  out by discussant  Mark Bils. 
Joshua Angrist  concurred with  the discussants  that the imprecision  of 
the estimates unavoidably  reduced the sharpness  of their conclusions.  He 
also agreed with Rouse that externalities might be stronger at the city than 
at the state level; but he noted that, as the instruments  are available only at 
the state level,  further disaggregation  is simply not feasible. On the issue 
of potential selection bias, Angrist said one should remember that compul- 
sory schooling  laws were passed  in the early twentieth  century, at a time 
when  many  children  left school  to enter  the labor market; at that time, 
school-leavers  were  not  necessarily  troublemakers  who  did  badly  in 
school  and  whose  benefit  from  extra schooling  might  be  smaller  than 
average.  Regarding  policy  implications,  he  noted  that  the  absence  of 
externalities  does not necessarily justify cutting subsidies  to education,  as 
there are also distributional  consequences. 
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Benjamin Friedman suggested  that it might be possible  to exploit data 
on geographical  mobility by state to get sharper estimates.  In particular, 
we  might  expect the externality to be smaller in states with higher  labor 
mobility. Acemoglu  agreed in principle,  but worried  about adding  more 
endogenous  variables  to  the  analysis;  he  also  thought  the  approach 
might  make  more  sense  at the  city  level.  Andrew  Atkeson  noted  the 
high  rates  of  mobility,  both  within  and  across  countries,  of  educated 
workers;  he  argued  that  with  sufficient  migration  the  method  of  the 
paper  would  be  unable  to detect  an externality.  Acemoglu  pointed  out 
that  65% of the  people  between  ages  45 and  49 are still living  in their 
states  on birth, so that mobility  is far from complete;  still, he conceded 
that 30-35%  rates of migration  might  be enough  to arbitrage away  the 
externalities  created by local schooling  laws. 
John Leahy said that it is not obvious  that mobility  reduces  the exter- 
nality. He cited Michael Kremer's O-ring theory, which  implies  that the 
ability to move  increases  external returns.  On the subject of the validity 
of the instruments,  Leahy wondered  whether  CSLs might not be corre- 
lated with  urbanization,  which  differs across states and is highly  persis- 
tent over time.  If so,  their exogeneity  with  respect to wages  thirty years 
later might be questioned. 
Valerie Ramey warned  that one should  be careful in using  this type of 
estimate  in cross-country  comparisons,  as doing  so  implicitly  assumes 
constant  returns  in  the  externality.  She  pointed  out  that the  economic 
implications  of  moving  from  average  education  of  9 years  to  12 years 
might be very different from moving  from a population  that cannot read 
to one that can. The authors agreed with  this comment. 
About  the negative  correlation  of the instruments  with  college  atten- 
dance,  Olivier Blanchard mentioned  the possibility  that states view  their 
education  budgets  as fixed,  so that if more is spent  on high  school  then 
the subsidy  to postsecondary  education  falls; in principle,  at least, this is 
testable.  Gregory  Mankiw  noted  that,  if Blanchard is right  and  if it is 
also  the  case  that  externalities  differ  by  level  of  education,  then  the 
paper's  findings  are suspect.  Acemoglu  agreed  that if Blanchard's hy- 
pothesis  is right and if the returns to college  education  are much higher 
than the returns to attending  high school,  this paper would  be underesti- 
mating  the  externality;  but  he  thought  it unlikely  that the  overall  bias 
would  be large. 
Mankiw  also  raised  the  issue  of how  one  should  frame the  null  hy- 
pothesis:  Is it, for example,  that the externality is large enough  to justify 
current education  policy?  From that perspective,  if one-third  of educa- 
tion costs  are borne by taxpayers  and the external effect is roughly  half 
the private  effect,  then  on  the basis  of this paper  we  cannot  reject the 74  DISCUSSION 
hypothesis  that  current  policy  is  optimal.  Ben  Beranke  added  that, 
since  the wage  measure  is before  tax, a marginal  tax rate of about one- 
third already justifies  the current level  of subsidy.  Mark Bils objected  to 
Bemanke's  conclusion  on the ground  that it ignores  the fact that school 
subsidies  themselves  must  be  financed  through  distortionary  taxation. 